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 Abstract
 
 
This thesis explores a narrow but important aspect of the conflict in Afghanistan when it seeks to 
identify limitations on ISAF’s ability for sharing intelligence with the Afghan National Security 
Forces. The case study is exploratory and utilizes a mixed methods approach where the initial 
qualitative phase aims to identify what ISAF intelligence officers recognize as hurdles for 
sharing. Data is collected through interviews, field observations and participation in partner 
meetings. The concurrent quantitative phase is based on a survey of all-source analysts and aims 
to expand on the qualitative research and also to identify how the analysts’ perceptions influence 
ISAF’s ability for intelligence sharing.  
Even though ISAF has got the appropriate documentation and processes in place, a lack of 
education, training and open debate on moral dilemmas leave too much latitude and uncertainty 
in the hands of individuals. Missing quality control with the work of interpreters, the absence of 
universal standards for security markings, different national policies, procedures and caveats 
together with a mix of theatre-wide information systems are major obstacles for collaboration 
and limit ISAF’s ability for sharing intelligence with the Afghan National Security Forces. Also 
the underdeveloped Afghan security standards add problems of legitimacy, and it degrades the 
important level of trust between the partners. The combined effect of these challenges seems to 
be less sharing, and at a higher security cost than probably intended. 
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1 Introduction 
At the time of writing in early 2010 the Afghanistan conflict has entered its 9th running year and 
President Obama has announced another significant U.S. troop increase. The present thesis will 
look into a narrow but important aspect of this conflict. Its purpose is to identify limitations on 
the International Security Assistance Forces’ (ISAF) ability to share intelligence with the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF). 
 
Why intelligence sharing? ISAF is authorized by the United Nations (2001) to render support to 
Afghan Authorities. In short its exit strategy is to make itself redundant through the development 
of, and eventual transfer of security responsibilities to, the ANSF. Anthony Cordesman has in a 
few words argued the central rationale for such a strategy (2009, p. ii): 
 
NATO/ISAF and U.S. forces cannot win this kind of military victory on their own. Their 
success will be determined in large part by how well and how quickly they build up a 
much larger and more effective Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) first to support 
NATO/ISAF efforts, then take the lead, and eventually replace NATO/ISAF and US 
forces.  
 
This strategy implies two distinct ISAF activities vis-à-vis the ANSF (UN, 2009): (1) to reform, 
enhance and expand their force structure; and (2) to partner with them in operations. The 
interdependence that stems from operational partnership rests on mutual situational awareness, 
something Michael Herman (2001) alludes to when he argues that common intelligence 
assessments are prerequisite for collective action by coalitions of the willing. In the present 
Afghanistan context the coalition must necessarily also embrace the host nation security forces. 
Dame Pauline Neville-Jones adds that “there have to be some generally accepted basic principles 
to which all forces involved in an operation sign up. The starting point has to be minimizing the 
risk of the forces involved while maximizing their effectiveness.” (2003, p. ii). Both principles 
are dependent on good intelligence support, indicating that ISAF’s force protection and ultimate 
success hinge on functioning intelligence collaboration with the ANSF. It is this partnering 
activity that forms the point of departure for the present thesis. 
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However, this kind of collaboration is not well described, either within the existing academic 
literature or in military doctrines. The American Joint Publication 3-24 on counterinsurgency 
operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009) has devoted less than half a page on the issue of 
intelligence integration with the host nation. The doctrine states that sharing is important, but 
counters this advice with a prudent reminder on the need for protecting sources and capacities as 
well as on the threat of infiltration. 
 
The design of the present thesis is inspired by John W. Creswell’s (2009) latest contribution to 
the field of social science research methodologies and processes. Its philosophical worldview is 
problem-centred and real-world oriented – a pragmatism that fits well with the author’s 
professional background as a military officer. The study utilizes a mixed methods approach with 
a concurrent triangulation strategy that will be presented in greater detail in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
will introduce an analytical framework comprising basic assumptions of factors that could limit 
intelligence sharing from a multinational force to the host nation in contexts like in Afghanistan. 
Chapter 4 aims to identify what ISAF intelligence officers recognize as hurdles for intelligence 
sharing with the ANSF, including how they understand the force’ policy and how they practice 
such sharing. The empirical basis is five semi-structured interviews with centrally placed ISAF 
intelligence officers as well as field observations and participation in partner meetings. Chapter 5 
aims to expand on the qualitative research and to identify how analysts’ perceptions of the 
sharing environment influence ISAF’s ability for intelligence sharing. The empirical basis is a 
survey of all-source analysts within “ISAF Joint Command” (IJC) and “Regional Command 
North” (RC (N)). Chapter 6 will summarize the findings and draw conclusions on those issues 
that limit ISAFs ability for sharing intelligence with the Afghan National Security Forces.  
 
At this point it is prudent to inform about my personal experience from serving as chief of ISAF 
Headquarters Combined Joint Intelligence Planning Section (Chief CJ2 Plans) from December 
2008 to June 2009. Intelligence sharing with our Afghan counterparts was already then regarded 
as important, and my section was deeply involved. The research question thus stems from being 
exposed to a real-world practical problem: What limits ISAF's ability for sharing intelligence with 
the Afghan National Security Forces? 
 
Lacking proper intelligence theories or even a clear definition of intelligence itself (Treverton, 
Jones, Boraz, & Lipscy, 2006) the analytical framework of my research will start with a 
discussion of three basic models of the intelligence cycle. These rather plain models with their 
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step-by-step approach to intelligence production are central for understanding how intelligence 
organizations and national communities work, but they are not sufficient to explain how they 
interact and collaborate with foreign partners. Herman’s model (1996), later discussed by Robert 
M. Clark (2007) and evolved by Sir David Omand (2009) will therefore be expanded in chapter 
3 for the purpose of this study by the introduction of two central concepts: (1) communication 
per se; and (2) circular reporting. It will be argued that these two concepts comprise important 
interface hurdles for intelligence sharing. Communication with foreign partners is difficult 
because of the need for interpretation and because of cultural differences. Circular reporting, 
which means that shared intelligence is channelled back into the intelligence cycle as new 
information, is a hindrance towards sharing because the efforts to expose it soaks up scarce 
analytical resources. 
 
Based on a review of central texts on intelligence and my personal experience as an intelligence 
officer, three additional factors have been added to the analytical model which will be used to 
focus the research. The combination of these three factors make up what this study refers to as 
the sharing environment. Secrecy (3) is the most distinctive feature of intelligence and is used as 
a means for protection of information about capacity, methods and sources (Herman, 1996). The 
need for secrecy is in itself a hindrance for sharing of all types of intelligence in all types of 
settings, but certain characteristics of the Afghan context make sharing even more demanding. 
The multinationality (4) of the force including multilateral frameworks for intelligence sharing is 
also likely to be a hindrance toward sharing because of interface hurdles and differences in 
national policy, procedures, processes and capacity. Finally, intelligence ethics (5) and moral 
dilemmas of those involved are likely to be a hindrance towards intelligence sharing because of 
the potential fatal consequences of sharing what should have been withheld, and conversely the 
same effects of not disseminating what should have been shared. 
 
In a partnership like the one between ISAF and ANSF the sharing of information and 
intelligence is a two-way road. The exchange will become easier and more unrestricted further 
down in the chain of command with fewer countries involved (as the research demonstrates, 
these two issues are closely related). The present research is however focussed on identifying 
difficulties arising from the dynamics on a multinational level. In ISAF this narrows the scope to 
higher headquarters from the regional level up. Further, it is the ability of the multinational ISAF 
rather than the will or ability of the Afghans that will be investigated. The aim is therefore to 
identify what limits ISAF headquarters’ ability for disseminating intelligence to the ANSF, and 
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not the other way around. In a setting characterized by secrecy, trust and personal 
responsibilities, the organizational ability for sharing is, however, affected by the willingness of 
single intelligence professionals to produce and share intelligence. This will is dependent on the 
analysts’ knowledge of ISAF’s policy, procedures and processes for intelligence sharing as well 
as their perceptions of the sharing environment to include their host nation partners, demanding 
this to be a major part of the research. 
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2 Research design 
This research, which aims to identify limitations on ISAF’s ability to share intelligence with the 
Afghan National Security Forces, will be conducted as an exploratory case study (Yin, 2003) 
utilizing a mixed methods approach with a concurrent triangulation strategy (Creswell, 2009). 
The exploratory nature comes as a consequence of limited existing studies on multinational 
intelligence collaboration in similar contexts. My rationale for choosing a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods is to enhance the reliability of the data on this relatively 
sensitive topic. Creswell (2009) suggests such mixed methods designs precisely when qualitative 
or quantitative methods alone seem inadequate for understanding the problem. He also proposes 
that “in a concurrent triangulation approach, the researcher collects both quantitative and 
qualitative data concurrently and then compares the two databases to determine if there is 
convergence, differences, or some combination.” (p. 213). 
 
The point of departure for my research will be some basic assumptions on factors that could limit 
intelligence sharing from a multinational force to the host nation in contexts such as Afghanistan. 
These assumptions will be developed through a literature review were Herman’s (1996) seminal 
work “Intelligence power in peace and war” is central, but the work will also be informed by my 
own experiences. The assumptions are not hypotheses to be tested, but rather part of an 
analytical framework acting as focussing lenses for the research. During the field studies it was, 
however, important for me to keep an open mind to unexpected outcomes. One part of the 
framework is a modified model of the intelligence cycle. The model will be developed and 
presented in chapter 3 for use in this specific study, but it could potentially have wider and more 
general applications.  
 
The case study is limited to examining how central ISAF intelligence professionals at a specific 
point in time consider the possibilities for intelligence sharing with their Afghan counterparts. 
Data was collected during my field trip to Afghanistan from 2 to 17 February 2010, only a few 
weeks after Major General Michael T. Flynn made public his “Blueprint for Making [American] 
Intelligence relevant in Afghanistan” (Flynn, Pottinger, & Batchelor, 2010). For the intelligence 
community this directive was epoch-making, and as significant as the recent developments in 
ISAF’s command and headquarters structure.1 To collect data so early in the implementation 
phase of both these processes could have influenced the results in various ways. To postpone the 
                                                 
1
 ISAF’s organizational developments throughout the autumn 2009 are presented in more detail in paragraph 4.1. 
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field trip was, however, not a practical option. Both the interview guide (annex B) and the survey 
questionnaire (annex C) was developed in Norway and tested among experienced Afghanistan 
analysts on 20 January 2010. This test provided valuable inputs for a final calibration of these 
instruments. 
 
The purpose of the qualitative interviews (chapter 4) was to identify what ISAF intelligence 
officers recognize as hurdles for intelligence sharing with the ANSF, including how they 
understand ISAF’s policy and how they practice such sharing. The empirical base is five 
interviews; three with intelligence officers in IJC at Kabul International Airport; and two with 
similar personnel in RC (N) close to Masar-e Sharif. All five occupied central positions related 
to sharing, and most of them as senior all-source analysts. I selected these officers based on 
discussions with intelligence leaders in the two commands precisely for their experience and 
involvement in intelligence collaboration with the host nation. During my two weeks’ stay in 
Afghanistan I also had the opportunity to observe work practices, to discuss with intelligence 
leaders and staff members, and to participate in collaborative partner meetings and official 
briefings.  
 
The purpose of the quantitative research (chapter 5) is to expand on the qualitative research and 
to identify how analysts’ perceptions of the sharing environment influence ISAF’s ability for 
intelligence sharing.2 The empirical data was collected through a survey of 19 all-source 
intelligence analysts from IJC and seven from RC (N), representing the majority of such 
personnel in the intelligence hubs of those commands.3 Because of the inherent intelligence 
sensitivities, a cross-sectional self-administered questionnaire was chosen as the best vehicle for 
accessing this type of data. The questionnaire consists of 25 items, each presenting five 
alternative answers on a Likert scale. It also contains three open-ended questions. The 
demographic part of the questionnaire was developed with a view not to challenge general 
intelligence sensitivities, separating only military from civilian employees and establishing their 
intelligence experience with ISAF.  
 
                                                 
2
 As discussed in chapter 1, the term “sharing environment” in this study comprises of, and refers to, the three 
factors secrecy, multinationality and ethics.  
3
 The applicable intelligence organizations of IJC and RC (N) are presented in more detail in the opening paragraphs 
of chapter 4. 
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The field trip was divided in two periods, with the first nine days spent in IJC and the rest in RC 
(N). The two first days in both commands were used for familiarization, introduction and more 
general discussions with intelligence leaders. The bulk of the time was then used for interviews, 
participation in meetings and briefings as well as for observations and conversations. With one 
exception the interviews were carried out in Norwegian establishments. The final action in both 
IJC and RC (N) was to conduct the survey. After a plenary introduction, this was carried out at 
each analyst’s work place without my presence. Transcription of the interviews and sorting of 
survey data were completed in Afghanistan while I still had easy access to the respondents, while 
the actual analysis was done in Norway immediately after.  
 
The reliability of the data could have been influenced by preconceptions and biases that stem 
from my background as an intelligence analyst and former ISAF employee. The fact that the 
research was welcomed by ISAF as both timely and relevant could similarly have influenced 
respondents to act and appear more involved and proactive than they genuinely were. It may also 
be that respondents with varied cultural and linguistic backgrounds understood questions and 
survey statements differently. To remove some of this potential ambiguity, tests of both the 
interview guide and survey questionnaire were conducted in advance. In order to obtain reliable 
data on sensitive topics it was important for me to guarantee the respondents’ anonymity, even if 
this would make it harder for others to trace the research. The reliability could also have been 
affected by the fact that data was collected by an officer senior to many in the target group, and 
who benefited from recent operational experience. Sensitive about this, respondents could have 
been eager to impress with their own and ISAF’s recent progress. Also security sensitivities 
could have influenced the reliability of especially the unclassified interviews. Instead of 
following their impulse not to discuss certain issues, respondents could have felt compelled to 
answer something or anything. Finally I would like to emphasize that an unclassified study on 
intelligence sharing can only hope to scratch the surface on some of the more sensitive topics. 
One such issue is how national policy on intelligence sharing and caveats differ between the 
ISAF troop-contributing nations. 
 
When it comes to the internal validity of the study, it is worth mentioning that IJC was only a 
few months old at the time of data collection. The headquarters staff, which partly emanated 
from the old ISAF headquarters, was still in a run-in period and adapting to new realities. The 
increased emphasis on intelligence collaboration and associated documentation on policy and 
practices was equally fresh, while the operational tempo was as high as ever. To compensate for 
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such challenges the research covered two quite different headquarters, with RC (N) temporarily 
lesser marked by the new initiatives. Still, IJC and RC (N) count for only two of the altogether 
seven multinational ISAF headquarters at or above the regional level. The total number is even 
higher if the headquarters of the new NATO Training Command is included. The thesis therefore 
represents a snapshot of no more than roughly a quarter of the multinational headquarters at a 
very turbulent and hectic period for ISAF.  
 
To counter these validity challenges the research utilizes three tools proposed by Creswell 
(2009): (1) triangulation between qualitative and quantitative methods; (2) rich and thick 
descriptions; and (3) detailed step-by-step explanations. Even if some scholars, and among them 
Helen Simons, find that “combining or mixing methods does not necessarily strengthen validity” 
(Simons, 2009, p. 130), I propose that parts of my research as well as the validity of certain 
findings were dependent on such an approach. Finally, Yin proposes “to have the draft report 
reviewed, not just by peers […] but also by the participants and informants in the case.” (2003, p. 
159). A last effort to improve the overall reliability and validity of the study was thus to give 
ISAF a chance to review a draft version of the paper. Even if the external validity of this 
confined case study is limited, it brings to light issues that would restrict intelligence sharing in 
similar contexts. As such, some of the findings could be transferrable.   
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3 Analytical framework  
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce an analytical framework with basic assumptions of 
factors that could limit intelligence sharing from a multinational force to the host nation in 
contexts like the one in Afghanistan. To frame the discussions and for better appreciating the 
“elusiveness” of intelligence as a research area, it will open with a short review of the state of 
intelligence theory and definitions, emphasising how this relates to sharing. The discussion will 
then focus on three basic models of the intelligence cycle; their shortcomings related to sharing 
and consequently propose a modified model that is better suited to identify challenges for such 
sharing. Communication and circular reporting are two such challenges that will be illustrated in 
more detail in chapter 4 through the use of case specific examples. Finally, this chapter will 
introduce the three focussing factors or lenses that together form the sharing environment in this 
study: secrecy, multinationality and ethics. 
 
3.1 Intelligence theory and how it relates to sharing 
Intelligence as a phenomenon is complex and elusive, both in itself and even more so within the 
framework of international relations. To recognize aspects of this “specialness” is essential for 
appreciating the challenges associated with multinational intelligence sharing. A short review of 
the academic, political and military discourse related to intelligence theory and sharing will do 
much to accomplish this. 
 
When, on 15 Jun 2005 the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence and RAND 
Corporation gathered 40 practitioners, academics, and specialists from Europe and North 
America for a one-day workshop to discuss how theories underlie American intelligence work 
and how they could lead to a better understanding of intelligence, it became clear (Treverton, et 
al., 2006) that: (1) there is no uniquely, either American or any other theory of intelligence; (2) 
there is not even a common agreed definition of intelligence; and (3) there are also diverging 
views on the very essence of intelligence. Finally, in the context of different national practices, 
there is also a lack of academic agreement on the dividing lines between foreign and domestic 
intelligence, and between domestic intelligence and law enforcement.  
 
In its conclusion the workshop report focuses on the observation that under the present security 
challenges even the strongest states becomes more coalition builders than unilateral “doers”, and 
it singles out the importance of intelligence sharing (Treverton, et al., 2006, p. 32):  
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Here, a theory of intelligence might help intelligence move beyond its ad hoc initiatives. Theory 
might help because moving intelligence back and forth to state and local partners, let alone non-
friendly limited partners in the war on intelligence [terror], will take intelligence back to first 
principles: who needs what, when, and how? What is intelligence? What is classification and 
“need to know”? 
 
This line of thought brings the report (p. 32) to rhetorically paraphrase and expand on questions 
earlier proposed by Michael Herman:  
 
Now, as the nature of states change, how far can their intelligence services become focal points 
for cooperation, even transparency? What are the limits of their potential to reach out, not just 
sharing choice tidbits with favoured partners, but engaging in joint problem-solving with 
corporations and NGOs, as well as states and local authorities and foreign partners? 
 
It is evident from these discussions that even under the threat from international terrorism, states 
and agencies feel challenged when intelligence is proposed as a vehicle for cooperation. Herman 
(1996) suggests that security considerations limit the willingness of states to engage in 
intelligence collaboration and sharing. He further suggests that “every new foreign exchange is a 
new risk […].” (p. 207). This ingrained scepticism is part of the backdrop for any serious debate 
on intelligence sharing. Introverted risk considerations and self censoring leads to restraints that 
cause both international and inter-agency friction. This kind of “cultural isolation” in turn spurs 
articulated as well as latent differences in policy and execution, resulting in a rather motley and 
elusive baseline for those tasked with drawing up intelligence policy and practical procedures for 
a multinational force. 
 
After 9/11 the political mood in many Western countries has turned towards more intelligence 
cooperation. The communities are, however, permeated with conservatism and they are for many 
reasons slow to react, even within national confines. After the failed 2009 Christmas Day terror 
plot to bring down a commercial jetliner en route to from Amsterdam to Detroit, New York 
Times journalists Jeff Zeleny and Helene Cooper cited White House officials eluding to the (still 
existing) domestic problem of sharing: “[…] The president was standing by his top national 
security advisers, including those whose agencies failed to communicate with one another.” 
(Zeleny & Cooper, 2010, Jan 6). 
 
           
 17 
 
 
            
          
 
 
The difficulties that were identified by Herman already in 1996 are evidently much the same 
after more than a decade of coalition operations from the Balkans via Afghanistan to Iraq. The 
latest American doctrine on counterinsurgency operations admits that “foreign disclosure 
guidelines could be a significant constraint to intelligence sharing with allies [my italics]” (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2009, p. V3).4 What then about sharing with unknown host nation partners? The 
doctrine continues: “This [sharing intelligence with coalition partners] is important in 
maintaining the integrity of a common holistic understanding of the OE [Operational 
Environment].” When discussing integration with the host nation, the doctrine simply asserts that 
“sharing intelligence with HN [host nation] security forces and government personnel is an 
important and effective means of supporting their COIN efforts.” (p. V14). However, this is 
immediately followed by a caveat: 
 
When sharing intelligence with the HN, it is important to understand the level of infiltration by 
insurgents or foreign intelligence services. Insofar as possible, intelligence should be tailored so 
required intelligence still gets to HN consumers but does not give away information about sources 
and capabilities. 
 
3.2 The intelligence cycle 
A multinational force ability to share intelligence with the host nation depends inter alia on how 
that nation is aligned with, and adapted into the overall intelligence production cycle. Any new 
partner has to be treated both as a source of information and as a user of intelligence. As a source 
the partner will be judged by the timeliness, reliability and validity of the information it provides, 
and as a user by its ability to safeguard and not misuse the intelligence it receives. On this 
frontier of multilateral interaction are some general challenges for intelligence sharing: (1) to 
secure that written and verbal communication transcends language and cultural barriers with its 
contents and meaning intact; and (2) to safeguard against unchecked information backflows into 
the production cycle. Mechanisms for dealing with both these challenges will act as throttles on 
the multinational force ability to share intelligence. To visualize this it is necessary to stipulate a 
                                                 
4
 American National Disclosure Policy is described in some detail in Joint Publication 2-0: Joint and National 
Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Annex E (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004): “USG [United States 
Government] policy is to treat classified military information as a national security asset, which may be shared with 
foreign governments and international organizations only when there is a clearly defined advantage to the United 
States. […] in exceptional cases it will be in US interests to make information available to a foreign government 
before concluding an [security] agreement, even if the recipient government’s safeguards appear inadequate.” 
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model by how intelligence is produced in a multinational setting, including how a third party fits 
into the overall intelligence cycle.    
 
3.2.1 Traditional models  
In the midst of all controversies and discussions that surround intelligence definitions and 
theories, practitioners and scholars at least seem to agree on a few basics for a model of the 
intelligence process. Herman’s (1996) basic version introduces three main stages: (1) collection 
with single-source outputs; (2) all-source analysis drawing from all available information; and 
(3) dissemination of intelligence reports to the policy and decision-makers. He also explains an 
intermediate stage between analysis and users where the broader intelligence community 
produces top level national assessments.5 The problem with this and prospective models is that 
they create expectations of a fixed sequential process from collection via analysis to 
dissemination. The truth is, as Herman alludes to in his fuller intelligence process portrayed 
below (1996, p. 43), that intelligence and information is disseminated to the users from all stages 
in the process. Another of his findings is that “output of single-source collection incorporates 
substantial analysis and interpretation” (1996, p. 41), and that collection agencies function 
almost as stand-alone intelligence centres with single-source products going directly to users. 
Herman then turns our attention to the crucial division of responsibility between single-source 
communities as experts on techniques and all-source communities as experts on subjects.  
Single-source 
collection, 
processing, 
reporting
All-source 
analysis and 
dissemination
U
S
E
R
S
Top level 
national 
assessment and 
dissemination
Single-source reports
 
Figure 1: Herman’s “Fuller intelligence process” 
                                                 
5
 In this study the term assessment, primarily a UK definition used for common intelligence products, is used to 
cover all finished forward-looking intelligence products, including the similar estimate used by the U.S. in inter-
agency National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). 
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Before looking at other generic models it is important to notice that they all have a purely 
national perspective where intelligence – in principle – is produced bottom-up in a one-way 
stream from collectors to users with direction and tasking flowing the other way. In a 
multinational setting this is more complex. Here all-source analysts will receive and use a range 
of products from single-source outputs to finished intelligence products, much of it stemming 
from organizations and processes controlled by troop-contributing nations rather than by the 
multinational force they are supporting. How this influences intelligence sharing and how it may 
be incorporated in the models will be discussed later.  
 
In Robert M. Clark’s discussion of a target-centric approach to intelligence analysis he presents a 
traditional model of what he describes as “almost a theological concept” of an intelligence cycle 
(2007, p. 11). With six steps, this model may look somewhat different than Herman’s, but the 
similarities are in fact bigger than the differences. The circular structure and arrows seem to 
emphasize a one-way cycle that according to Herman and many intelligence practitioners is 
misleading. This is exactly Clark’s point, and he spends some time criticizing the model for its 
many flaws, among them also for constraining the flow of information. The reason for bringing 
forward Clark’s traditional model rather than the one he proposes as an alternative is that it more 
closely resembles what nations teach in their doctrines and intelligence courses. The model that 
is presented in the American intelligence doctrine (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) could act as an 
example, even if that variant is without arrows and has the mission included in the centre.  
1. Requirements, 
needs
2. Planning, 
direction
3. Collection
4. Processing
5. Analysis, 
production
5. Dissemination
 
Figure 2: Clark's “Traditional Intelligence Cycle” 
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For our purpose the biggest difference between Herman and Clark is the isolation of the 
processing step from collection. This new step includes translation, decryption, validation and 
organization of the content into report formats. It however misses to explain that collector 
agencies or sections de facto execute their own dissemination to all-source agencies or sections 
as well as directly to intelligence users. A more thorough discussion of what it means to organize 
information into reports would hint to this. One formality is to include a proper security 
classification – something that no professional would forget. Another is to label it for release to 
foreign countries and/or organization(s), and a third and less frequently used is to annotate if 
further distribution is permitted. The last is admittedly less of a regular formality than a practical 
adaptation in the field. One example of how documents can be marked for further distribution is: 
“This report can be released to Afghan Authorities”. These formalities are, together with the 
communication channels used, the vehicles by which intelligence operators on all levels 
influence and control the dissemination of their products. Here is where the producers display 
restraints and fears and where they prove their good will or credulity related to intelligence 
collaboration and sharing. Much more than personal credibility is at stake, something that will be 
discussed later. 
 
The last model to be introduced is one that Sir David Omand (2009) presented during the autumn 
2009 Professional Advanced Intelligence Course at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff 
College in Oslo. To answer some of the criticism of earlier models he places user interaction 
outside the cycle, while keeping corporate direction of intelligence collection and production 
inside.6 He then includes a new first (and last) step of the cycle highlighting the overall 
intelligence goal of improving decisions and enabling action. Herman’s first stage and Clark’s 
collection step has been developed under the new label “accessing”, highlighting that modern 
intelligence operations not only happen behind enemy lines, but also by accessing data protected 
personal information (something Omand labels PROTINT) and through more extensive use of 
open source information. Another difference is that Herman’s analysis and intermediate 
assessment stages, or Clarks analysis and production step, has been grouped under the new label 
“elucidating”. 
                                                 
6
 Scholars and practitioners tend to discuss exactly how close the interaction or dialogue between intelligence 
producers and their customers should be, and how the production should be directed. As for products, the end users 
of intelligence typically want (Omand, 2009): “Raw reporting, as fast as possible (but validated and caveated) [then] 
analysed intelligence, in its context with understanding of significance [and finally] assessed intelligence, all-source, 
with explanatory power, forward looking but informed by understanding of the past.” 
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Action-on
Directing
AccessingElucidating
User 
interaction
Disseminating
 
Figure 3: Omand’s new intelligence cycle  
 
 
This latest model answers, though it could be argued in a too simplistic way, much of the earlier 
criticism of user interaction with the different steps or stages of the intelligence process. 
However, it still presents it as a one-way continuous cycle. This is not wrong, but as earlier 
argued nor does it tell the full story. The model still misses to visualize intervening feedback 
loops as well as the separate mini-cycles that occur within each collection agency or section. The 
latter point is especially relevant for understanding problems related to multinational intelligence 
sharing in a setting where all-source analysts are pooled together from different nations and 
cultures and fed a mixture of single and all-source products over which they have little 
ownership or influence. Analysts simply have to view received information as a product of its 
own intelligence cycle and they have to honour its security classification and authorized 
disclosure.  
 
3.2.2 A modified model that visualizes challenges for sharing 
A modified model, specific for this study, is informed by all three versions above and proposes a 
baseline for better understanding intelligence collaboration between international partners, 
including between a multinational force and the host nation. It could be argued that it also better 
reflects the overall intelligence universe where collectors and analysts receive and utilize 
information from both domestically controlled sources and foreign partners alike, and were they 
disseminate their products to national and foreign users as well as to intelligence colleagues 
within their own community. In order to promote a holistic understanding of the intelligence 
production cycle, and for completeness, the model includes a typical user-producer interaction 
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with on the one hand the resource and tasking dialogue informed by intelligence requirements 
and costs, and on the other the product dialogue where the producer supports the user acquiring 
the best possible understanding of the disseminated intelligence. The product dialogue is 
typically also used for clarifications and adjustments of the requirements.7 In a multinational 
setting where the distance is greater between producers and users and where there are more 
hurdles, the interaction will often be limited to responding to each other’s formal requirements 
for information with less room for dialogue or discussions. In accordance with mutual 
understanding and agreements the partners provide each other with anything from raw data to 
finished products, but the flow will be controlled by a stern disclosure process. 
 
Requirements
Planning and 
direction
Accessing 
and collection
Analysis and 
assessments
Dissemination
Action-on
Product dialogue Partners
Dissemination
User domain
Partner domain
User interaction
Internal user processes
Requests for information
* Resource and tasking dialogue
*
 
Figure 4: A modified intelligence cycle 
 
The model depicts the partner as a user of intelligence in its own right, as well as being a source 
disseminating its own single-source and finished intelligence products. For this exchange to be 
meaningful both partners have to interpret information and intelligence in a similar way across 
cultural and language barriers, something that gives rise to a need for interpretation and wider 
cultural awareness. The model also visualizes the risk of intelligence flowing back via the 
                                                 
7
 Product is here understood in accordance with Abram N. Shulsky’s rather wide definition: “The product of the 
intelligence process can be any means, from a formal report to a hurried conversation […]”.(1993, p. 63) 
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partner into the production cycle from the dissemination steps, either directly to analysis and 
assessments or via the accessing and collection step as circular reporting.8 This could be 
intentionally where the partner even fabricates or alters the original information in order to serve 
some selfish purposes, or it could be by chance. Lacking mechanisms for dealing with both these 
challenges will reduce the multinational force’s ability for sharing intelligence with its partners.  
 
3.3 How secrecy and information defences limit sharing 
After determining how the host nation fits into the overall intelligence cycle and challenges 
related with that, it is now time to introduce the three focussing factors or lenses that constitute 
the sharing environment in this study; first secrecy and then multinationality and ethics. These 
will affect all intelligence cooperation, but could be exacerbated by special characteristics of the 
host nation, including the often immature and heterogeneous nature of its intelligence services 
and security forces.  
 
Secrecy and the corresponding security arrangements are potentially the most limiting factor on a 
multinational force ability to share intelligence, something that makes it necessary to explore this 
phenomenon in some detail. Secrets are protected by formal security markings that differ from 
nation to nation, and these “labels” act as limiters both for the use of sensitive information and 
for its further distribution. For intelligence producers to willingly share their products the 
receiving party has to be; (1) sanctioned as a legitimate user in general and also of each specific 
product, indicating that they could receive it as long as; (2) the person(s) actually receiving the 
products are authorized for it; and (3) the organization they represent need the information in 
order to perform their duties or execute their missions. As a consequence of their personal 
security responsibilities, intelligence professionals will typically also on a more subjective basis 
consider the recipient’s trustworthiness before sharing.  
 
To sanction a new user and to approve the release of certain types of intelligence is a matter of 
policy, but how to implement the policy is a matter of procedure and processes as well as 
knowledge, education and real world experience. To determine what intelligence the new user or 
partner need to know is on the other hand based on judgement. A lack of formal authorization 
                                                 
8
 The problem of circular reporting in a multinational environment is highlighted by the United States Air Force: 
“Several times during Operations PROVIDE PROMISE and DENY FLIGHT, (US operations in Bosnia) 
information collected from US sources was passed to NATO officials, who later reported the information back into 
the US intelligence system. The same thing happened in reverse.” (United States Air Force, 2007, p. 18) 
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should normally exclude the dissemination of intelligence while a lack of trust between 
individuals and organizations will hamper it, even if the intention is to share. The use of security 
markings, authorization procedures and the much debated need-to-know mantra will be 
examined further in theory. Only experience will however reveal if a partner properly safeguards 
and does not misuse the intelligence he is provided. This can be measured, but in practice it will 
be ascertained more by perceptions and suppositions of those involved in sharing. 
 
3.3.1 Reasons for secrecy and protective security 
In “Intelligence Power in Peace and War”, Herman (1996) opens with a passage on the history of 
“secret intelligence” were he points out that spies and informers providing sensitive information 
are as old as government itself. When later discussing characteristics of intelligence collection he 
states that “[it] seeks to penetrate what is denied to normal information gathering.” (p. 88). He 
follows up with highlighting three reasons for secrecy: (1) it adds value by opening possibilities 
because the target does not know what has been collected; (2) it conceals methods from possible 
peacetime doubts over legality and propriety; and most important (3) it protects the collection 
process and consequently single sources vulnerable to countermeasures. These reasons can be 
summarized as the requirement for protecting intelligence capacity, methods and sources, and 
some would also add intentions. The objective is to protect the future flow of information more 
than the content of already provided intelligence. Herman proposes that “secrecy’s effects run 
throughout the complete intelligence system and are its most distinctive feature.” (1996, p. 98). 
 
There is little discussion about the needs for secrecy, and the concept of “secret intelligence” has 
broad academic support. When Jennifer E. Sims criticizes the American “propensity to equate 
intelligence with secrets […]” (2005, p. 38) as a dangerous cognitive block, she does not suggest 
that security should be relaxed – in many cases rather the opposite. What she asks for, along with 
other scholars, is a more active use of open sources in the intelligence production. In addition to 
increasing the information base, this would stimulate a necessary paradigm shift from a situation 
where intelligence users tend to emphasize and trust intelligence according to its security 
classification more than its contents and relevancy. The higher classification, the more important 
and interesting seems to be the mantra among practitioners and users still today. This is in itself 
an important discussion, however not part of the present research. Here it is sufficient to 
recognize that secrecy is ingrained in the intelligence community and expected by intelligence 
users. The concepts of secrecy and its guardian information security is honoured and rewarded 
throughout the intelligence universe.   
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Secrets are however not secrets for long without certain protection. This is why governments 
“erect information defences” (Herman, 1996, p. 165). Herman continues by identifying three 
different components of information security, where the first one; protective security9 is most 
relevant for this study. Protective security include measures such as personnel vetting, control of 
contact with foreigners, access control to premises as well as rules for the classification, custody 
and transmission of documents – all serving a broad concept described as “need to know”. 
Abram N. Shulsky claims that “in general, anyone controlling classified information is 
responsible for ascertaining a requester’s need to know before providing the information.” (1993, 
p. 113). In many countries this responsibility is covered by law.  In Norway it is for instance a 
criminal offence punishable with up to one year in prison not to prevent the dissemination of 
classified information to unauthorized personnel (Security Act, 1998). Not surprisingly, the 
resulting fear of providing information to unauthorized users and bias towards protection seeps 
into the spine of intelligence professionals. 
 
3.3.2 Sharing only with sanctioned users and the use of security markings 
Before host nation organizations are entitled to receive intelligence they have to be sanctioned as 
legitimate users, something that is a policy question. Then each product has to be disclosed for 
their release, something that is subject to individual judgement and more of a procedural 
question. Intelligence producers contribute to this process by marking their products with the 
appropriate security classification and by advising what dissemination should be allowed. If we 
continue to use Norway and Norwegian law as example, section 11 of the Security Act (1998) 
establishes that “the person who issues or otherwise produces sensitive information shall ensure 
that the information is marked with the appropriate security classification. Security classification 
shall not be carried out to a greater extent than is strictly necessary, and the security 
classification used shall be no higher than necessary.” It is further established that one of the 
following standards shall be used (translated from Norwegian): “TOP SECRET”, “SECRET”, 
“CONFIDENTIAL” or “RESTRICTED”, and directions for their use are provided.  
 
Not all countries adapt similar legislation or practices, but at least NATO nations adhere to the 
same basic principles. The U.S. system described by Shulsky (1993) is for instance very similar. 
                                                 
9
 There are several notions and definitions related to the concept of security. The Norwegian National Security 
Authority’s (NSM, undated) description of protective security is for instance much wider than the one introduced by 
Herman and used in this study. 
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For the benefit of cooperation the security classification will be supplemented by amplifying 
directions for dissemination, such as e.g. “(originating country) SECRET - Releasable to NATO 
as NATO SECRET”. The complete security marking or parts thereof can be in the language of 
the originating country, or in English. Some producers will add supplementing directions, e.g. 
“this product is the property of (country or agency) – further release is (not authorized or 
authorized) to…”, and all will take it for granted that the shared information is not disseminated 
outside the predetermined countries or organizations without their explicit consent. There are, 
however, no universal standards for these markings and practices differ considerably between 
nations and agencies.  
 
Working under a NATO umbrella this is different. Here nations have agreed to adhere to a 
common set of basic security regulations and standards coordinated and implemented by the 
NATO Office of Security (NATO, 2006). One of the Office’s responsibilities is to negotiate 
security arrangements with non-NATO countries that receive NATO classified information. 
Included in the mentioned standards are NATO approved security classifications, where the term 
“NATO” is a qualifier demanding that the information should be protected in accordance with 
NATO Security Policy (NATO, 2002). This signifies that a Force Commander working in the 
NATO chain of command is bound by NATO policy when handling NATO classified 
intelligence. He will in practice be given latitude for further dissemination of intelligence that is 
released to his command in the first place, including threat warnings and other time sensitive 
intelligence. The subtle nuances in how to treat intelligence marked with different types of 
security markings may be of superior importance for maintaining international trust, but they are 
very demanding for intelligence and security professionals alike.  
 
Section 11 of the Norwegian Security Act (1998) also vaguely discusses the concept of 
international intelligence collaboration: “Provided that there is reciprocity, the King may make 
an agreement with a foreign state or international organization concerning the security 
classification of information received that is so classified by the state or international 
organization in question, and concerning the obligation to take steps to secure such information.” 
This alludes to the sensitivities involved in handling information received through international 
cooperation. Herman notes: “Those given access to sensitive intelligence by a foreign partner 
have to follow the partner’s rules to the letter.” (1996, p. 211). His point is underlined by Hans 
Born and Ian Leigh who state that (2005, p. 64):  
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[…] bilateral relations can only be maintained and continued if both parties fully and strictly 
respect the basic agreement underlying their intelligence sharing: that the origin and details of 
intelligence provided by the partner service will be protected according to its classification and 
will not be passed on to third parties. 
 
Even stable relationships nourished by deep mutual trust are fragile and susceptible to immediate 
curtailment or even termination if mishandled. To understand how intelligence organizations 
work and how sharing is practiced it is vital to acknowledge these sensitivities as well as the 
personal responsibilities and legal accountabilities involved, often held by junior analysts with 
limited experience. Intelligence cooperation could even in the most benign of circumstances be 
described as difficult, and “security makes states think twice about international collaboration 
that involves sharing” (Herman, 1996, p. 192). 
 
3.3.3 Sharing only with authorized personnel – vetting and security clearance  
After establishing that the host nation is a sanctioned user and that a specific intelligence product 
is disclosed for their release, those involved in the dissemination process should ascertain that 
the receiving person(s) are actually vetted and authorized for that security classification. A lack 
of authorized host nation personnel will consequently limit the multinational force ability to 
share intelligence. In Norway, also these responsibilities are covered by law: “Any person who 
might gain access to sensitive information, shall receive authorization.” (Changes to the Security 
Act, 2008). The purpose of authorization is to ensure that only personnel with a potential need to 
know get access to sensitive information. Further: “Any person receiving authorization for access 
to sensitive information shall in advance undergo security clearance [my translations from 
section 19].”  Security clearance is a national responsibility and is granted through a formal 
vetting process, also labelled as screening (Shulsky, 1993). The main purpose of this process is 
to assure the vetted persons ability to keep secrets. In Norway this process entails (Security Act, 
1998): 
 
[…] vetting shall cover information in the possession of the clearance authority concerned and 
searching of relevant public registers […]. Vetting may also cover other sources, including 
statements from places where the person being vetted has served or worked, public authorities or 
references that have been provided or are supplementary. 
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The objective of vetting or screening is thus to exclude unfit personnel from gaining a security 
clearance. According to section 21 of the Security Act (1998), “security clearance shall only be 
given or maintained if there is no reasonable doubt [my italics] as to the suitability of the person 
concerned with respect to security.”  Of specific matters to be assessed is: “Connection with 
domestic or foreign organizations which have illicit objectives, which may threaten the 
democratic social order or which consider violence or acts of terrorism to be acceptable means.” 
In NATO countries such vetting processes progress through established routines as everyday 
business, and in most other countries it would be possible for the government to establish ad-hoc 
routines to satisfy at least rudimentary immediate vetting needs. In so-called failed states or 
former failed states this, however, becomes more difficult. Public registers may be of limited 
value or even non-existent, and personal papers of any kind will typically be in short supply. In 
Afghanistan these difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that many persons only answer given 
names, and many have fled or moved extensively throughout more than three decades of 
upheavals and armed struggle. Loyalty could be hard to measure in a country were survival has 
become art.  
 
3.3.4 The final obstacle: sharing only with those who need to know  
The final security related obstacle for intelligence sharing is that the receiving party has to need 
the information in order to perform its duties or execute its missions. This “need to know” 
principle has over time manifested itself into a mantra that typically works against sharing. The 
principle has recently been under attack, but it has so far managed to resist a louder and louder 
call for “need to share”, even within a single country or intelligence community.  
 
Much as the present Afghanistan conflict itself, the recent call for change of policy and 
procedures for intelligence sharing originates from the devastating 11 September 2001 bombings 
in the United States. The executive summary of the 9/11 Commission Report highlights: “The 
U.S. government has access to a vast amount of information. But it has a weak system for 
processing and using what it has. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system 
of "need to share."” (2004, p. 24). Jumping five years forward to the aftermath of the failed 2009 
Christmas Day bombing commented above, Congresswoman Jane Harman made the following 
comment (2009, Dec 30): 
 
As an author of the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, I have been saying for years that better 
information sharing is needed and turf cannot be jealously guarded. That Act set up a process to 
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transition from a "need to know" to a "need to share" culture, but the Christmas bomb incident is 
evidence that we have much work to do. 
 
The call for change originates from the United States, and was first and foremost a finger pointed 
at U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies dealing with homeland security. Lately it has 
however also emerged in the context of ongoing coalition operations. In Iraq, a former 
commander of Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I), General David H. Petraeus through his 
Counterinsurgency Guidance directed: “Operate on a “need to share” rather than a “need to 
know” basis; disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.” (2008, 
p. 2). In Afghanistan, the present commander’s similar guidance is even more explicit on the 
importance of interaction between the coalition and the host nation security forces: “Live and 
train together, plan and operate together. Share the same battle-rhythm and information. Integrate 
your command and control structures.” (McChrystal & Hall, 2009, p. 5) 
 
The real issue, all the way from 9/11 via Iraq to Afghanistan, may be to identify more exactly 
what friends and partners alike need to know – as a means to an end – rather than to replace it 
with a “need to share” culture that sounds more like an objective in its own right. Few would 
argue that intelligence capacity, methods and sources, as well as sensitive information, suddenly 
have lost their vulnerability or need for protection. Used as a means, a recognized need to know 
status does not remove the requirements for authorization or the preceding vetting filters, or any 
other security measures for that matter. The challenge is to come to workable solutions in an 
environment where partnering and enhancing the capacity of local security forces is required and 
mandatory, but where the security risks are as huge as the host nation’s ability for proper vetting 
and authorization are neglectable. To force a more active identification of who need to know 
could function as the longed for eye-opener and driver for change among intelligence operators 
and custodians of information defences alike, and it is a familiar concept. 
 
Another point is that it’s hard to measure success or hold anyone accountable for a “need to 
share” policy. Intelligence professionals could always argue that they are sharing that which is 
possible within the security constrictions they work. It is further difficult to support a widely 
interpreted “need to share” policy from a security official’s point of view. The task of getting 
host nation individuals vetted and authorized for receiving large amounts of intelligence could be 
insurmountable. The same goes for the partner’s ability to securely hold and store such 
intelligence. Based on their operational achievements and feedback it is somewhat easier to 
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judge if they get what they need to know in order to succeed and maintain adequate force 
protection, both for themselves and for the coalition troops with whom they cooperate. The 
multinational forces’ ability for intelligence sharing is thus to a certain extent dependent on a 
coherent recognition and judgement of what the host nation partners need to know in order to 
perform their duties or execute their missions.  
 
3.4  The Multinational Force 
The organization of a multinational force will affect its internal coherence in different ways and 
on different levels, including its ability for intelligence sharing. As established above, the 
research will focus on the multinational aspects of intelligence sharing to include the coherence 
and compatibility of policy, procedures and information systems between the different troop-
contributing nations as well as on existing multilateral intelligence frameworks. In order to better 
understand the complex multinational dynamics, it is useful to separately examine each 
organizational level of the force, from the lowest tactical level to the force headquarters before 
discussing multilateral frameworks for intelligence cooperation. 
 
Not all components of a multinational force are equally engaged in truly multinational 
operations. As will be discussed below, the local level is often characterized by nationally 
homogenous units that answer to their own peculiar policies and regulations as much as to the 
alliance or coalition headquarters. Such units engage bilaterally with the host nation and share 
intelligence in accordance with pragmatic national policies. This is not to imply that intelligence 
sharing is unproblematic on a bilateral level or even within a purely national context. In his 
thesis on American lessons from the Phoenix Program10 during the Vietnam War, Lieutenant 
Colonel Ken Tovo comments (2005, p. 10) :  
 
[…] while senior leaders synchronized objectives at the highest level, organizations 
might still be working at cross-purposes at lower levels. This was particularly true in the 
intelligence arena, where organizational rivalries often hindered intelligence sharing, as 
agencies treated their best sources and critical pieces of intelligence in a proprietary 
manner. 
 
                                                 
10
 Phoenix Program is the code name for a five year long U.S. attack on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) during 
the Vietnam War. VCI were clandestine operatives living within the South Vietnamese society and supporting the 
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in the field. 
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To understand how intelligence works in a multinational setting it is also important to recognize 
that most headquarters practice certain compartmentalization of analytical responsibilities. Some 
analysts have functional responsibilities; for instance for counter-narcotics or insurgency 
funding, and some have geographical responsibilities where they more holistically cover the 
situation within the operational boundaries of one or a few subordinate commands. The result is 
that individual analysts within a single staff section interact with, and depend on contributions 
from different intelligence collectors and nations. Often geographically oriented analysts in a 
superior headquarters are from the same nation(s) that make up the majority of the subordinate 
headquarters within the analyst’s area of responsibility, but not always. Likewise, functionally 
oriented analysts are often from nations that take lead in, or put special emphasis on a specific 
problem area, but not always.  
 
3.4.1 Forces in the field – coherent but geographically fragmented 
Forces in the field that engage in partnered operations are typically nationally homogeneous, or 
they have embedded smaller detachments from one, or more rarely a few other nations. One 
result of this set-up is more bilaterally oriented intelligence relations with local host nation 
forces, something that falls outside this study to discuss. Even so, to appreciate the web of such 
bilateral relations is important to understand the complex dynamics of the sharing environment 
in a setting like Afghanistan. These tactical level units are typically organized in brigade or 
battalion sized task forces, each assigned a geographical area of responsibility that most often 
coincides with the host nation political boundaries. In counterinsurgency operations a common 
operational technique is to conduct so-called Combined Action between coalition and host nation 
forces where small detachments down to platoon or even squad level live among and provide 
security to the indigenous population (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009). Such units have modest 
intelligence staffs and also more locally defined information needs.  
 
Some units, like Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan, focus as much on 
enhancing local governance and development as on the security line of operation (NATO, 2008). 
Consequently their intelligence needs are wider than appreciating hostile capacities and 
intentions.11 A common denominator for all tactical level units is, however, that they are the ones 
most frequently placing soldiers at risk. Even if authority in the form of operational control is 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
11
 See for instance Peter Dahl Thruelsen’s (2008, p. 37) recommendations for the S2 (intelligence) staff section of 
the ISAF deployed Danish Battlegroup embedded in Task Force Helmand of Regional Command South. 
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transferred to the commander of the multinational force, their sending nation will continue to 
have a vested interest in both their use and safety.  
 
The combination of nationally homogenous units and explicit demands for force protection are 
precisely why intelligence sharing often becomes easier and sometimes also more unrestricted at 
this level. When partners team up for interdependent combat missions their success and survival 
rely on a common understanding of the battlefield. Intelligence sharing will therefore be handled 
bilaterally and in as pragmatic and practical a manner as possible within national rules and 
regulations, putting a premium on mission accomplishment as well as shorter and longer term 
force protection. But even at this level the key word is trust. Experiences from Vietnam (Tovo, 
2005) proved that the South Vietnamese security forces were infiltrated by the Viet Cong at 
every level, leading to curtailment of combined operations and intelligence sharing.  
 
Units in the field are typically supported by forward deployed national logistics, and by reach 
back systems for administration and information support with all communication conducted in 
their own mother tongue. These “support” channels secure strong national control over the 
utilization of force contributions, and the information systems and procedures reflect national 
policy and capacity also in the field of intelligence and security. In sum this makes up a web of 
what could be described as pragmatic national battlefield approaches supported by separate 
policies, capacities and information systems. On a higher organizational level this complex web 
meets with a universal command requirement for uniformity and transparency.12 
 
3.4.2 Regional headquarters – less coherent but regionally more independent 
Regional headquarters are as different as their lead nations, but they are all in the front line of 
facing the challenges ingrained in multinational intelligence sharing. Between units in the field 
and the higher level coalition headquarters, the modern post cold war intervention or peace-
keeping force typically deploy multinational headquarters with regional responsibilities. These 
are commanded by a lead nation that normally also provides the lion share of troops and 
headquarters staff. In Afghanistan a total of five regional headquarters have been established; RC 
Capital on rotation between Turkey, France and Italy; RC North led by Germany; RC West by 
                                                 
12
 See also Angela Gendron’s discussion of political sensitivities and national interests in the context of intelligence 
ethics in peace support operations (2006, pp. 168-169). 
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Italy; RC South, so far on rotation between Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom; 
and finally RC East led by the United States. 
 
In such fixed regional settings the incentives are strong for the lead nation to deploy and 
maintain solid intelligence support; both in the form of assets assigned to the multinational force 
and nationally controlled ones. This “lead nation layer” will place itself on top of the local web 
of national battlefield approaches described above, and it will reflect the inherent differences in 
capacity and policy between the lead nations. Because of the multinational manning of most 
regional headquarters the lead nation cannot or will typically not impose its own information 
systems on the staff, but they will run them in parallel. The recognized information systems will 
be those supplied by the lead nation or alliance, and the manning of the headquarters and its 
intelligence staff will be along the same lines as those described for the force headquarters 
below. The exception to this norm is where the region is led by the U.S. Their headquarters and 
subordinate regional forces tend to be more homogenous than others, and they are typically run 
on national American information systems.  
 
This regional set-up that is based on a local web of bilaterally oriented relationships produces 
tangible geographical differences with respect to intelligence coverage and capacity. To some 
extent the force commander can counter this by apportionment of force level assets, but huge 
differences will remain. More relevant for this study, however, are the openings this regional set-
up creates for differences in policy and practices related to intelligence sharing. The 
multinational force and the emerging host nation security forces therefore have to expect and 
adapt to quite extensive regional and local differences.  
 
3.4.3 Force headquarters – as coherent as its framework  
It is the commander of the multinational force who, within certain limitations, determines policy 
for intelligence sharing, and it is his headquarters that promulgate procedures, processes and 
facilitating mechanisms for such sharing. High level coalition headquarters in the NATO chain 
of command are truly multinational, manned and led by staff and high ranking officers from 
different nations on rotation. How, and by what system this rotation is managed differs from case 
to case, and also over time. In ISAF the commander and some of his key officers has now been 
permanently assigned to the nation with most “boots on the ground” – the United States. The 
other participating nations will, however, make sure that they are represented with both leaders 
and staff commensurable with their national contributions. This is in theory also the case for 
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intelligence professionals. However, with only a few exceptions all intelligence positions have 
up to now been manned by NATO nations. The reason for this is that the main information 
systems have been supplied by NATO, and these are authorized for NATO access only. In 
coalition operations outside NATO the information systems will typically be supplied by the lead 
nation, and the intelligence staffs will emanate from the same – or in the case of Anglo-Saxon 
led operations, from one of the “five-eye” countries (see paragraph 3.4.4 below) authorized to 
access specific domains of those systems.  
 
For intelligence collection and analytical support the force headquarters to a large extent depend 
on reach back to the participating nations, and in the case of NATO operations also to the NATO 
chain of command. For this reason and purpose, many of the nations will be represented on or 
near the headquarters compound by a National Intelligence Cell (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004, p. 
IV20). How this greater in-theatre intelligence community functions, and how nations engage 
and support the multinational force will influence the headquarters’ ability to produce relevant, 
timely and reliable products and to cooperate effectively with any third party, including the host 
nation. An environment distinguished by differences in national policies, regulations and caveats 
will induce doubts and restraints in the minds of intelligence producers, something that would 
impact negatively on both the timeliness of reports and on information security. Even those 
smaller states that Gendron denotes as “free riders” and that in her words contribute “very little if 
anything to its [the peace alliance] effectiveness” can help overcome some of these hurdles by 
displaying positive sentiments and forming “regional coalitions in which intelligence is freely 
shared […]” (Gendron, 2006, p. 171). 
 
In NATO led operations there are multitudes of information systems at work, especially at the 
force level, but also at regional levels. National Intelligence Cells utilize their own systems with 
air-gaps or firewalls13 to the multinational systems. Intelligence collectors operate on highly 
sensitive national or NATO systems with air-gaps or firewalls between them, and with air-gaps 
to the less sensitive systems that analysts use in their work. Analysts on their side can use either 
“NATO secret” or specific “mission secret” systems with firewalls between them, while many 
Americans in addition will depend heavily on their national SIPRNET (Secret Internet Protocol 
Router Network) with air-gaps to NATO systems. As discussed above, all these systems require 
                                                 
13
 Air-gaps between information systems indicate that the systems are physically separated and that data has to be 
transferred manually between them. A separation by firewall on the other hand indicates that the systems are 
connected, and that they are able to exchange data pending the right “keys” to the firewall.   
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different authorization and seen together they will display a huge variety of security markings – 
both officially sanctioned and some more pragmatic and context dependent. This layout 
necessarily complicates the production of releasable products and it arguably represents one of 
the biggest obstacles for intelligence sharing. 
 
3.4.4 Multilateral frameworks for intelligence cooperation 
As intelligence cooperation between states is typically executed bilaterally, there are few real 
multilateral frameworks or “intelligence clubs” in existence. However, one such transnational 
club dates back to the Second World War and traces its origins from the close intelligence 
cooperation between the five English speaking allies U.S., UK, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand (Born & Leigh, 2005). From this relationship developed what Herman (1996) describes 
as the “UK-US (and Old Commonwealth)” model based on the intelligence community with 
separate collection and analysis agencies, departmental defence intelligence and some sort of 
community assessments forming “a national system; […] to be managed as a national resource” 
(Herman, 1996, p. 27). The similarities are thus bigger than the differences between the five 
Anglo-Saxon countries that are included in this framework.  
 
This successful wartime cooperation became permanent with especially signals intelligence 
integrated to the point of common manning and analysis. The relationship is further underpinned 
by “[…] comparable national security practices supplemented by special agreements for the 
handling of intelligence; these include formal limitations on what can be passed outside the UK-
US-Commonwealth circle [my italics]” (Herman, 1996, pp. 210-211). This “five-eye” 
community obviously simplifies intelligence cooperation between the designated nations, and 
could in theory help to facilitate sharing also with other partners, including the host nation. The 
reverse effect is that it brings about a sense of class division among coalition members of being 
“inside” or left “outside”, something that does not enhance cooperation and sharing. 
 
The other multilateral intelligence framework worth mentioning is composed of the NATO 
alliance itself. Over the last 60 odd years it has developed to a mature and proven undertaking, 
with some probably arguing fixed and inflexible bureaucracy. The NATO framework does not 
employ much in the form of organic collection assets, and is therefore mostly based on its ability 
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to receive, handle and share large amounts of national intelligence outputs. With regards to 
security, Herman notes (1996, p. 364): 
 
The NATO system included multinational intelligence staffs, but always had the insoluble 
problem of protecting fragile intelligence sources in a multinational environment. […] nations 
judged their most important national intelligence to be too sensitive to be put into NATO in this 
‘official’ way. 
 
Also this framework leaves some “inside” and others “outside”, something that was briefly 
discussed above with the composition of the force headquarters and manning of the intelligence 
staff. For practical purposes this implies that the intelligence community of multinational forces 
is divided into four ascending “access levels”; first the grand coalition with all troop contributing 
nations; then the NATO members; then the “five-eye” community or derivates thereof; and 
finally the national level with established or ad-hoc bilateral relations. Add then the host nation, 
and these five levels could be described as the multinational variant of Sir David Omand’s 
“concentric circles of trust” (2007, pp. 120-122). The wider coalition community is supported by 
a “mission secret” information system, NATO members by a “NATO secret” system, and the 
five-eye community by access to shareable domains of national systems – all utilizing the 
English language. Finally, each individual nation is supported by national systems in their own 
mother tongue. So far, dissemination of intelligence to the outermost fifth circle or host nation 
has been “air-gapped” to them in the form of documents or, more frequently, through verbal 
communication. 
 
Even during the Cold War when the alliance was much smaller than today and its member 
nations perceived an existential threat, intelligence exchange was hampered by a lack of trust in 
the wider NATO community’s ability to keep secrets. In today’s environment, with interventions 
and peace-keeping coalition operations in so-called failed states, the action is further away from 
home and most nations feel less existentially threatened. This could lead both ways with regards 
to their readiness for intelligence sharing. Some could be willing to take more risks; including 
sharing with the host nation, while others could, at least initially, draw the opposite conclusion. 
To operate with up to five concentric circles of trust that is built on a web of pragmatic national 
battlefield approaches and separate information systems is by its sheer complexity counteracting 
the very idea of intelligence sharing. 
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3.5 Intelligence ethics 
When Angela Gendron discuss intelligence ethics in peace support operations, she comments 
that “a state’s failure to share relevant and timely intelligence is ethically indefensible unless 
there are strong grounds for supposing that the negative affects to the state or its allies outweigh 
the benefits.” (2006, p. 170). Her remarks may be pointed towards the internal intelligence 
sharing within peacekeeping forces, but they must be equally justified in situations where the 
fulfilment of a UN mandate demands sharing also with the host nation. She continues: 
“Classifying and continuing to review intelligence with the object of facilitating sharing may be 
a resource-intensive and complex procedure for organizations, but it is one which is necessary if 
it is to fulfil its international obligations.” (p. 170) 
 
These comments must be seen in context with her remarks that some members of the force may 
anyway decide to withhold intelligence for their own national reasons, because they are 
restricted by third party rules or concerned that their information could be misused or not 
properly protected. One such third party rule could be that the intelligence in question has been 
based on bilaterally received information, something that precludes further dissemination 
without the originator’s consent. Examples of misuse could be that the intelligence is used to 
enhance the standing of one of the factions in internal host nation power struggles, or simply for 
tipping off criminals. As discussed above, the protection of sensitive information is neither 
simple nor clear cut even in a developed country with a mature security regime. The reasons for 
encouraging restrictive sharing policies are therefore valid and the risks taken by more liberal 
practices have ethical aspects and dilemmas of their own.  
 
Gendron’s comments raises at least two moral dilemmas for those multinational staff workers 
that are engaged in the production of releasable intelligence: (1) what to do in situations where 
they judge that the intelligence on hand for different reasons should be released to the host 
nation, but where the source has classified it in a way that prohibits its release; and (2) how much 
they should let their own perceptions of the receiving party’s trustworthiness influence their 
intelligence sharing practices. Based on earlier discussions the textbook answer to the first 
question is to withhold such intelligence until the source has been consulted, and to the second as 
a minimum to make sure that the recipients “need to know” and that they have been authorized 
for the classification level they receive.  
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In a hectic operational environment where commanders and staffs necessarily have to apply 
some measure of pragmatic realism against both shorter and longer term objectives, both these 
answers could, however, prove insurmountable requirements. Gendron notes that (2006, p. 170):  
 
[…] sharing often takes place in spite of the rules rather than because of them. Users in the field 
may resort to ad hoc creative and discretionary measures to compensate for the lack of formal 
arrangements or to circumvent rules that are seen as too restrictive.  
 
There are also other ethical aspects of intelligence and intelligence sharing. In their timely work 
on oversight of security and intelligence services, Born and Leigh discuss how a professional 
code of ethics may help practitioners to “perform the respective jobs in a just and morally 
satisfactory manner” (2005, p. 47). They continue: 
 
To devise a professional code of ethics, and to offer training courses for intelligence staffers, is a 
useful means to set, communicate and maintain a minimum level of shared practices among 
intelligence employees. 
 
To my knowledge none of the post cold war multinational peace support operations has codified 
intelligence ethics as part of their Standard Operating Procedures. However, it may be that a 
simple code and associated training classes could help overcome some of the limitations on 
multinational forces ability to share intelligence with the host nation. Another discussion in their 
chapter on International Cooperation concerns cooperation with foreign intelligence services in 
relation to human rights and especially torture (Born & Leigh, 2005, pp. 64-67). Agreeable to the 
fact that international law does not discuss the use of information obtained by a partner state’s 
security services through torture, they anyway argue that it ought to be forbidden. A question or 
dilemma that might materialize for analysts about to share intelligence is thus whether that piece 
of information could lead to somebody being captured and then tortured. However important 
such ethical considerations are, many would argue that they should not impact on decisions to 
share intelligence. Arguably the Security Sector Reform with its education and training 
programmes and similar initiatives are better suited mechanisms for promoting basic human 
rights.  
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4 Recognized challenges for sharing 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify what ISAF intelligence officers recognize as hurdles for 
intelligence sharing with the ANSF, including how they understand the force’s policy and how 
they practice such sharing. In order to explain the context the chapter will, however, open with a 
short review of recent high-level developments in ISAF, to include: (1) how its command 
structure and partner integration has evolved; and (2) ISAF headquarters recent history for 
intelligence collaboration with the ANSF. Conforming to a long established practice never to 
reveal the identity of serving intelligence officers, both the name and rank of the interviewed 
officers cited throughout this chapter have been substituted with aliases. Capt. Anderson, Capt. 
Brown and Capt. Clark from IJC as well as Capt. Davis and Capt. Evans from RC (N) are all 
experienced professionals with a profound knowledge and understanding of ISAF partnering and 
sharing efforts.  
 
4.1 Recent developments within the ISAF command structure and partner integration  
Upon arrival in Kabul early February 2010 it became clear that the top echelons of ISAF had 
undergone dramatic changes since my departure in June 2009. The former ISAF headquarters in 
downtown Kabul had over a span of just a few months split in two, leaving a “four star” 
Commander ISAF headquarters at its old premises and a new “three star” headquarters at Kabul 
International Airport. Responsibilities are divided between them with the four star headquarters 
led by COMISAF, General Stanley A. McChrystal, handling strategic political-military aspects 
of the ISAF mission while the three star headquarters – ISAF Joint Command (IJC) – led by 
Lieutenant General David M. Rodriguez is running day-to-day military operations through the 
regional commands and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (NATO, 2009a). Also high level 
partnering has evolved with Afghan liaison officers from the three main branches of their 
security forces; the National Directorate of Security (NDS) charged with intelligence and 
security; the Afghan National Police (ANP); and the Afghan National Army (ANA) now 
permanently embedded in IJC and seated in the Combined Joint Operations Centre – an area 
where classified information is discussed and displayed on a continuous basis. 
 
ISAF’s higher level intelligence echelons have undergone intellectual developments that are no 
less dramatic. From quite recently being enemy-centric the efforts are now brought in line with 
the latest counterinsurgency thinking (McChrystal & Hall, 2009), focussing on understanding the 
Afghan society and its people. One effect of this change is that open and other non-sensitive 
sources of information have gained increased significance in the overall intelligence effort. Even 
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the name-change of the all-source intelligence shop in IJC from the traditional “Joint Intelligence 
Centre” (JIC) to “Information Dominance Centre” (IDC) bears witness to this mental 
development. Embedded in this centre’s cross-functional teams are personnel monitoring 
development and governance in addition to analysts looking at the more traditional security 
issues. Overall, IJC seems to favour the term information over intelligence as it better describes 
the needs of counterinsurgency operations, and because it is judged to simplify partnering and 
sharing (IJC, 2010). The intentions and directions of Major General Flynn (2010) are obviously 
taking hold.  
 
Continual partnering is also establishing itself within intelligence circles. The fact that ANSF 
will be permanently represented by a liaison officer from the National Directorate of Security in 
the Information Dominance Centre is earth shattering for a multinational command bound by 
rigid NATO security regulations. What can easily burn itself into the mind of someone with 
former experience from NATO headquarters and multinational operations is the mental picture 
of a senior Afghan police intelligence officer that is meeting with a non-American analyst under 
a 40 inch plasma screen displaying the SIPRNET screensaver. This is not to suggest a lenient or 
senseless treatment of sensitivities, but the Americans are leading the way – and they are serious. 
In this pragmatic euphoria of change and partnership it is tempting to call to mind those basic 
purposes of protective security; the protection of capacity, methods and sources (and some 
would add intentions). Not all information can or should be shared.  
 
At the time of data collection in February 2010, there were advanced plans for embedding ANSF 
officers also in the Combined Joint Operations Centre of RC (N), but there were no immediate 
plans for ANSF representation on the intelligence staff. Collaboration between partners was still 
conducted through liaison arrangements involving different sections and officers of the Regional 
Command with respective Afghan counterparts. The Provost Marshal kept in contact with the 
ANP, the HUMINT community with the NDS and the intelligence leadership itself with the 
ANA. RC (N) also kept a traditional organizational model for the intelligence staff, focussing 
mainly on the opposing insurgency forces. The command had, however, recently established a 
new staff element in the form of a multinational Intelligence Fusion Centre employing many of 
the same cross functions as IJC’s Information Dominance Centre. In many ways RC (N) seemed 
to be a small organizational step or two behind the Kabul developments, but in some areas at 
least catching up and preparing for more continuous partnering and sharing. It is fair to say that 
in February 2010 the higher command level was progressing steadily from a “we and them” 
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perspective to “us” and that the regional command was about to leave the starting block on the 
same journey.  
 
4.2 ISAF headquarters history of intelligence collaboration with the ANSF 
Partnering between ISAF HQ and its opposite ANSF headquarters is nothing new.14 Also under 
the former Commander ISAF, General David D. McKiernan, this effort was seen as vital for 
meeting the mandate, and as condition for the exit strategy. Staff sections and individuals were 
encouraged to partner to the fullest extent possible, and had to keep meticulous records of all 
their ANSF interactions. A number of regular venues for reciprocal sharing of intelligence and 
information were also established, and some leaders and staff officers from both sides grew to 
know each other quite well. As long as people did not work together on a regular basis or had 
access to common information and communication systems there were, however, limits to how 
far this type of partnership could be stretched. In fact, it turned out to be harder than expected to 
get people and staff together on a scale that would make a noticeable difference. Something 
more had to be done in order to get partnering and cooperation on the right track. 
 
It was therefore decided to station ISAF liaison officers within ANSF headquarters operation 
centres and in 2008 also to establish a common office space within the confines of the Afghan 
National Military Coordination Centre in Kabul for planning purposes. This entity was known by 
several names, but the most common was “Joint Planning Operation Centre (JPOC)”. The 
building itself was financed by American money, and it was fitted out with a combination of 
NATO and American sponsored equipment. The centre was permanently manned by ANSF 
planners, and it had separate office spaces with access to classified systems for ISAF planners 
working there on a semi-permanent basis. The JPOC building was certified to NATO security 
standards in 2009 and a handful of the Afghan officers working there were subject to vetting for 
proper ISAF security clearances and future authorization for access to classified ISAF areas and 
information. However, due to the lack of public records and other difficulties with establishing 
their past, this turned out to be a long-lasting process. 
 
The problem with especially the ISAF part of the JPOC during the first year or so was that it 
almost developed into a “state within the state” with its separate agenda working around and 
                                                 
14
 This short historic account has been established through conversations with two intelligence officers that were 
central in the partnering process under general McKiernan and also in standing up the Joint Planning Operation 
Centre (JPOC). 
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outside of the normal ISAF staff, and sometimes keeping them in the blind. Their relationship 
with the Afghans developed impeccably throughout, but with a tendency to separate the two 
partner staffs instead of bringing them closer together. The reasons could be many, possibly 
including a sense or relief within the core ISAF staff that partnering was now firmly taken off 
their shoulders and borne by the overwhelmed JPOC staff. Consequently, the intended “jump-
start” only worked for those inside, and they were fairly overworked already. Then, in June 2009 
General Stanley A. McChrystal and his team turned up, adding a new momentum to the 
partnering efforts.   
 
4.3 Communication and the use of interpreters 
The first findings of this research relate to communication challenges. Very few if any of the 
analysts in either IJC or RC (N) speak Dari or Pashtu, and their ANSF partners’ command of 
English is not much better. The use of interpreters is thus unavoidable. To translate a text or 
verbal communication is in itself difficult. The literal meaning of certain words and phrases 
differ in different languages and cultures, and poor interpretation could twist both the literal 
content and the intended message of an intelligence product. When Capt. Brown looks at 
information provided by Afghans, he occasionally finds that “whenever you look at it in English 
it really doesn’t make much sense. So I’m assuming similarly going back into Dari.” As in all 
human interaction and maybe more so in armed conflict and counterinsurgency operations where 
public perceptions are imperative, the consequences of poor translation and interpretation could 
be grave. Since “the ultimate object of intelligence is to enable action to be optimized by 
reducing ignorance” (Omand, 2007, p. 99), the consequences could be haphazard at best and 
even lethal at worst. Capt. Anderson is clear when he comments the use of interpreters: 
 
No, that’s probably the weakest link we have right now. Because we depend on translators 
translating our intelligence into Dari, so depending on the skillset of the translator, he could 
actually get the right meaning, or the wrong meaning. 
 
He then follows up with a couple of examples from his own experience. The first one is about 
the differences between mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs):  
 
We used to think that the Afghans didn’t differentiate between mines and IEDs – [that] they call 
them all mines. That’s not true, except the interpreter can’t pick up on the difference or just the 
other word the Afghans are using when they defer to mines. 
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In a situation where IEDs are the number one killer of coalition soldiers this difference is not 
trivial. The other example could at first seem almost humorous, but that is only until one realizes 
how extremely delicate any interaction with Afghan women are:  
 
The English word is metal detector […] the Dari word they use is wooden baton. So the actual 
paragraph said: ISAF and ANSF forces will search females with a wooden baton. Obviously that 
doesn’t work. 
 
Both these examples are from the translation of documents, but also the use of interpreters 
during meetings has its challenges. After observing a couple of meetings between Afghan and 
ISAF partners it is clear that the use of interpreters has not been properly rehearsed, either by 
Afghans or by the multinational staff. The challenge is even bigger for those with English as a 
second language. Sentences and statements become too long and complicated and they cover too 
many topics before the “terps” get a chance to translate. Many also keep eye-contact with the 
interpreters rather than their partners making the atmosphere less personal than could otherwise 
have been possible. Except for this, the meetings were held in a positive and friendly tone. 
 
4.4 The problem of circular reporting 
The danger of circular reporting is something that troubles intelligence professionals in their 
quest for corroboration of developing intelligence products. Lacking or inadequate mechanisms 
for precluding such inputs from the intelligence cycle therefore complicates production and, 
because of the resource drain on analysts, it also limits the appetite for intelligence sharing. The 
problem with circular reporting and information screening is considerable in ISAF even before 
the host nation makes its entrance into the intelligence cycle (Sterzer, McDuff, & Flasz, 2008): 
 
Circular reporting will always be an issue in the intelligence function. One single event can and 
will be reported in a dozen different products […] and then re-reported yet again in the near 
future. Furthermore, because there are few standardized products and templates for modern 
counter-insurgency (COIN) agreed upon by all the nations contributing to ISAF, some 
organizations omit to put the source of the information whereas others rewrite the information 
itself (occasionally with mistakes or changes). For an analyst, this is a major problem to say the 
least. The screening process of the information as well as its analysis requires an immense 
amount of focus and crosschecking, taking time that could be better spent on more vital tasks. 
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A single-source piece of information or intelligence could be extremely valuable, but most of the 
time it has to be confirmed by other sources before a commander is willing or procedurally able 
to take action, especially if there is a danger for collateral damage. In a setting like Afghanistan 
the concepts of corroboration, confirmation and circular reporting is probably best explained 
through the use of artificial, but illustrative local examples. The first could be described as “ideal 
world – by the book”:  
 
A few hours ago a human intelligence team from ISAF received a tip-off from a friendly source 
mentioning a new large-bore machine gun being installed on the roof of an abandoned building 
close to a village road sometimes used by ISAF and ANSF convoys. The team made their report 
and passed it up chain. Finally, it reaches the intelligence centre that judges it not to be very time 
sensitive, but anyhow starts the process for confirmation by cueing other collection assets. 
Imagery comes back with a clear picture of an old 20mm anti-aircraft artillery piece, and signal 
collectors report new and weapons-related insurgency transmissions in that cross-bearing. The 
initial report is now corroborated by three different sources, and everything is collated and 
assessed into a finished (and thus confirmed) intelligence product. The next stop for this piece of 
intelligence is the Joint Targeting Working Group, and after a thorough targeting process 
precluding the presence of civilians, a laser guided bomb destroys the gun without causing 
collateral damage or civilian casualties. That’s in the perfect world. 
 
The second artificial example is illustrative of a situation where the analyst’s job becomes more 
difficult because of circular reporting: 
 
Local citizen A has for years seen himself as the rightful heir to the job as police chief in district 
X, but was for political reasons passed over by distant citizen B. Citizen A has never come to 
terms with either citizen B or the sub-tribe he represents, and is looking for a way to get rid of 
him. The opportunity presents itself during a local meeting between Afghan security officials 
and ISAF. He accuses the absent police chief of being corrupt, and supports it with a plausible 
explanation. Both ISAF and Afghan officials take notes and walk away. The ISAF representative 
compiles his report to the regional command and sporadically mentions the incident. One of the 
Afghan officials decides to do some superficial investigation on his own, and happy with the 
results he distributes his report up the chain. One week later, in a regional meeting, an Afghan 
representative hands over to ISAF a report about a corrupt police chief in district X. An ISAF 
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analyst runs a database query and pulls out the week old report. Is this the corroboration he needs 
to confirm corruption? Maybe not, but the regional command anyway decide to include a short 
assessment of the two reports in their daily regional intelligence summary. Then the same 
happens again at the next higher level. The original, in this case fake report has been given a new 
spin at each level by both partners as it criss-crosses its way up the chain, and only a thorough 
criminal investigation can now confirm or deny what in the end looks like confirmed 
intelligence. 
 
Even though the interviews and conversations missed to identify circular reporting as a major 
obstacle for sharing, Capt. Clark alluded to it when he stated:  
 
We have a good environment for information sharing right now. But it is not entirely coordinated. 
[…] So, person A in ISAF may feed information or may share information with an official in 
GIRoA who in turn shares that information back to person B in ISAF as if it is information that 
belongs to the Government of Afghanistan. 
 
Similar concerns are vaguely expressed by the intelligence leadership in RC (N). Looking at the 
problem from a slightly different perspective they sometimes uncover that the same basic 
information or intelligence trickles into their system from different host nation organizations, and 
that some of it also has what they describe as a bit too “sensational” or inventive twist – perhaps 
pointing to a certain unhealthy competition between them for attention. It does not take much 
spin on information to make it hard for analysts to preclude circular reporting. Capt. Brown 
comments that in order to reduce this problem you need to look carefully for similarities, keep 
open communication with the originator and meticulously source all reports: “But is it something 
that will happen? No doubt about it. I think it will happen […] a lot of times.” In the extreme, 
false information could be used by competing Afghan factions to play the international force. 
Inventive modes of circular reporting would in that case be used proactively to convince both 
Afghan and ISAF intelligence staffs that they have got enough corroboration to conduct 
conclusive assessments that in turn could lead to indiscriminate action. In a worst case scenario 
this could lead to the targeting and killing of innocent civilians. 
 
4.5 The burden of secrecy and related security concerns 
When asked to elaborate on ISAF policy for sharing the three IJC officers seem quite confident, 
at least about the general gist of it. Capt. Anderson empathically responds “write-to-release”, 
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indicating that analysts should concentrate on making releasable products. The two others open 
with describing what classification level the Afghans could receive and by what methods the 
dissemination may be executed. All three demonstrate a strong support for partnership and 
intelligence sharing and believe this is the way forward. Capt. Clark emphasizes that ISAF has 
come a long way in this direction only during his short stay. They, along with other intelligence 
analysts in the Information Dominance Centre, however become more uncertain when later 
asked if they had seen the actual paperwork, or where to find details about procedures and 
processes. When asking Capt. Davies of RC (N) the same general question he opens with stating 
that “the policy is given by IJC in respective FRAGOs [fragmentation orders]”, which is 
objectively correct but that on the other hand could indicate a more distanced position to the 
challenge.  
 
Capt. Anderson’s immediate concern is what type of vetting process the Afghan recipients of 
ISAF intelligence have been subjected to: “There was never a […] supporting document that 
explained to the analyst how the ANSF staff were vetted.” His point goes straight to the heart of 
protective security where the holder of intelligence has certain responsibilities with regards to its 
dissemination. In his mind the Afghan authorities have been introduced to security formalities 
like vetting processes and “need to know” policies, but all three officers are ignorant about how 
the Afghans execute these procedures. Consequently the analysts do not know if their opposite 
ANSF numbers are properly vetted and authorized to receive the information they are presented, 
and have to take it for granted that they are. It later turns out that ISAF and Afghan authorities 
are addressing the vetting problem with adaptive procedures fitting to the local context. At least 
all the Afghan officers that are embedded in ISAF headquarters have undergone such screening 
and are authorized.   
 
When discussing release authority the three IJC officers agree that ISAF may release information 
and intelligence up to the ISAF SECRET level to the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA), and that there are three forms of dissemination: document release which 
means handing over a document in English or translated to Dari; information display where the 
information is visualized for the partners during a meeting, but with no copies handed out; and 
verbally during partner meetings and discussions. The two last methods turn out to be the 
officially preferred ISAF way of sharing. In Capt. Brown’s words: “you can show them some 
intelligence things back and forth but most of the time it is through verbal communication.” His 
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remark is also valid for RC (N), were most of the sharing is done through verbal communication. 
Sharing of documents is more infrequent and usually kept at a lower classification level.  
 
During follow-up conversations it is established that releasable documents have to be marked in 
a special way: “NATO/ISAF [Security classification] REL GIRoA” or “NATO/ISAF [Security 
classification] FOR DISPLAY ONLY GIRoA”, and that they have to be disseminated through 
the Theatre or a Unit Disclosure Officer15 for review and recording. To follow these instructions 
is, however, a problem for RC (N) as they do not have this function manned. Capt. Davies 
laconically confesses: “So we face a problem, concerning that. So there is no basic, no routine 
exchange of written products, so far”. A quick query of the main NATO database for finished 
intelligence products reveal that less than 1% of the archived ISAF related documents from 2009 
carry these classification markings. Even if the percentage could be expected to increase 
somewhat in line with the higher emphasis on sharing, it underscores that most intelligence 
collaboration is done verbally.  
 
Capt. Anderson accentuates the problem with security markings when he states: “There are no 
such things as “ISAF SECRET Releasable to GIRoA”, indicating that such a marking has been 
in use, but that it is not an authorized security classification (as a matter of fact, it lacks the word 
NATO). This exemplifies the confusion that surrounds classification markings and caveats. It 
could sound like nugatory semantics, but it represents real uncertainty and frustration amongst 
analysts on how to extract and make use of intelligence protected by a multitude of different 
security markings for their partnering and sharing purposes. This frustration leads one of the 
survey respondents to demand: “Ensure proper markings and information is used within the 
markings.” Capt. Anderson continues: “So you have to write your own product and try to figure 
out what is classified and needs to be protected, and what isn’t or doesn’t and draft your 
document like that – and you can share it.” This points a finger to those that do not follow 
NATO (and ISAF) standards, including classifying documents paragraph by paragraph and 
indicating what can be released.  
 
Another problem related to security classifications and sharing is highlighted in two survey 
comments, one of them emphasizing that “over classification tends to inhibit information 
sharing.” This alludes to a known tendency amongst intelligence producers to tilt against over-
                                                 
15
 These functions are tasked with supervising and controlling the dissemination of classified information and 
intelligence outside the alliance or coalition community. 
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classifying their products, be it for uncertainty, to make sure it has got enough protection, 
because of laziness or just to secure attention from the users. Classification markings are not 
only used for protecting sensitive information, but as Herman notes (1996) also for enhancing 
intelligence influence and as “departments’ badges and means of protecting and extending their 
territory.” (p. 93). Capt. Clark, however, observes a positive trend in ISAF where classifications 
are pushed down to the lowest level possible in order to facilitate sharing.  
 
An illustrative example of the confusion caused by security markings can be found in the NATO 
classified e-mail system. When starting a new e-mail the user is challenged to choose a security 
classification with releasability annotations from a pull-down menu of standard and officially 
sanctioned labels. This list is growing longer as NATO engages in new operations and with more 
official partners, like e.g. SFOR, KFOR, ISAF and the Partnership for Peace or Mediterranean 
Dialogue programs. The classification markings are then used as keys to the firewalls against 
other information systems. However, in February 2010 there were still no labels annotating 
releasability from NATO or ISAF to the host nation; GIRoA or ANSF. Even if this has had 
marginal practical consequences so far, it adds to the uncertainty and frustration of analysts.  
 
When discussing the problem of classification markings with other staff, and after searching the 
systems, it turns out that ISAF HQ has produced extensive documentation on both policy and 
procedures for how to share intelligence and information, most of it dated throughout the second 
half of 2009. Amongst these documents are classification guides and SOPs for information 
release and cooperation as well as clarifications on authority for sharing. The problem may be 
that people are overwhelmed and that theory to a certain extent is counteracted by the different 
but anyhow legitimate practices in use. A person using three different information systems soon 
finds that he has to adhere to three different standards for security markings, and he will receive 
even more from troop contributing nations that comply with their own national standards. A 
simple task that in a hectic operational environment should have been undemanding could soon 
turn into protracted detective work with continued negotiations between analysts and those 
contributing the intelligence. When discussing bottlenecks for sharing Capt. Brown suggests 
that: “It’s [the whole process] just time consuming. I think that is probably the biggest 
constraint”. In his mind uncertainty can spur analysts to turn to what they know best – their own 
national markings and caveats.   
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Capt. Anderson’s statement on how he produces his releasable products must not be interpreted 
in a way to suggest that analysts are ignorant of security or moral dilemmas; they are not. They 
understand all too well the requirement for protecting intelligence capacity, methods and 
sources. They also acknowledge the overriding principle that release of classified information is 
subject to consent by the originator. A consequence of all this is that some analysts find it easier 
to write their own releasable products bottom up, and keep them on an unclassified level. 
Anderson continues: “That really means you are writing an unclassified document.” This takes 
time, and it could hinder the sharing of critical information. Capt. Clark also alludes to this when 
he suggests: “If analysts don’t know what they can bring to the table, then I think they are more 
reluctant to bring anything”. 
 
When asked about major security concerns and related bottlenecks for sharing most of the 
officers highlight dismal Afghan security standards. Capt. Davies laconically summarizes this as 
“the holes in the ANSF where information is melting away.” Capt. Clark’s tone is more 
diplomatic when he judges that “you can never be 100 percent sure that what you are giving to a 
government official will not end up in a place where it was not intended to be.” Capt. Anderson 
on his side delivers a straight shot: “If I have a product in my hand, and I get to the Afghans 
there is zero degree of certainty that it is going to be safeguarded and kept”, and further: “The 
safeguards aren’t in place with GIRoA.” This is backed up by survey comments mentioning 
experiences of leaks where insurgents have been able to prevent or more effectively counter 
ISAF operations. 
 
What worries analysts most is apparently a different Afghan tradition and culture for handling of 
sensitive information as much as deliberate leaks. The examples they mention are leaving 
documents in places for others to view or grab and also uncontrolled access to meeting rooms. 
Capt. Clark exemplifies the last point: “You don’t know what he [the servant] is overhearing 
[…]”. He continues with mentioning a more traditional security risk: “Third party intelligence 
services may be active within the country.” These worries will not surprise anyone, and they are 
most certainly calculated into the risk of enhanced sharing and partnership. Partnership and 
information sharing are so vital for the counterinsurgency strategy that the generals are willing to 
accept much risk. 
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4.6 Multinationality and ISAF coherence 
Some of the more important restraints for intelligence sharing that stem from multinationality 
have already been discussed under the secrecy factor above. The multitude of different 
information systems and associated security markings produce insecurity among intelligence 
professionals tasked with partnering and sharing. The preferred system in Afghanistan is the 
mission specific “ISAF secret” system, but the problem with that in Capt Anderson’s mind is 
that there are not “a lot of ISAF secret terminals in the United States, or in Norway or in Britain 
or wherever.” That means that intelligence reach back to the force contributing capitals, either 
directly, or more commonly through the National Intelligence Cells have to go via national 
systems, either through firewalls or manually air-gapped. This form of communication 
counteracts both timeliness and relevance of intelligence in a fluid operational environment. It 
also contributes to the effect of writing on a higher than necessary classification level because 
reach back analysts tends to use national classification markings without thought for the wider 
in-theatre sharing needs. Capt. Davies feels that this side-effect of traditional intelligence 
stovepiping best can be overcome if “everybody is working on one system, and ISAF secret is 
the system which has to be used”. 
  
The security markings that each nation applies to its intelligence products mirror national caveats 
and differences that contribute to the complicated web of dos and don’ts for tested intelligence 
professionals. Capt. Anderson cites one of the more extreme variants of these caveats that have 
been presented to him personally: “We will not release anything to Afghanistan.” The discussion 
of national caveats is in itself sensitive, and to go into details or comment on specific nations is 
not possible in an open study. When pushed a bit, many of the analysts however acknowledge 
that there are big differences between the nations on how they look upon and practice sharing. 
As one survey comment puts it: “National level intel agencies do not share intelligence 
effectively. These nations do not write most of their finished intelligence production for sharing 
with ISAF and rarely if ever GIRoA.” Such caveats and differences manifest themselves already 
at the lowest tactical level where some of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Capt. 
Anderson’s mind are “prevented from getting a close working relationship with say their ANP or 
ANA partner”. The resulting differences then reflect on the regional commands where according 
to Capt. Brown, some of them “are a lot better at sharing information than others.” Such 
observations are supported by earlier findings (Bowman & Dale, 2009, p. 17):  
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An additional challenge is information flow among ISAF participants. […] Constraints on 
information flow may include the use of different—national and NATO—communications 
channels, linguistic barriers, and some reluctance on the part of some countries to share 
information perceived to be especially sensitive. 
 
Another sensitive issue is created by the multilateral intelligence frameworks and “concentric 
circles of trust” that are presented in chapter 3. Those staff members that come from a non-
NATO country (but still ISAF troop contributing nation) will not even be allowed into many of 
the intelligence staff’s workplaces. They simply lack the authorization to work in an 
environment where higher classified systems like the “NATO secret” system are present. Also 
NATO members outside the Anglo-Saxon “five-eye” community (or derivates thereof) are 
restricted from accessing certain areas, and on the top are national facilities and bilateral sharing 
arrangements. The fact that the overall intelligence capacity increases dramatically the closer to 
the centre the analyst finds himself does not help to alleviate mistrust and the feeling of being 
“inside” or left “outside”. Capt. Davies goes as far as he can when he states: “Like in every 
multinational environment there are some frictions between nations, if they’re NATO member or 
ISAF member […].” Another analyst admits that it can be frustrating to be in the centre of this 
circle as well. There is, however, a general feeling that ISAF is moving towards a more 
hospitable and inclusive sharing environment, something Capt. Brown articulate when he states 
that “the different nations that share with the headquarters is still a lot better than I’ve seen in 
other places”. Capt. Clark agrees: “I see things now that I don’t think I ever would [have] 
thought of seeing as far as information sharing among a multinational coalition.” 
 
The ISAF leadership has recently implemented certain initiatives that potentially could do much 
to overcome the barriers provided by multinationality, the first being a somewhat more open 
American intelligence posture. This is visualized by the appearance of SIPRNET terminals in the 
multinational Information Dominance Centre of IJC, a gesture that alone has done quite a bit to 
alleviate internal mistrust and friction. Capt. Clark thus believes that the overall picture is getting 
more coherent and “that our [ISAF] leadership is trying to ensure that it is.” He continues: “The 
information sharing environment is very positive […] many nations are willing to give enough.” 
Others are a bit less enthusiastic as exemplified by these survey comments: “In ISAF are already 
issues with intel sharing. National systems and national intel […]. Not shared with non-U.S. / 
non NATO countries.” And: “Too many stovepipes!! Not enough lateral movement of intel from 
ISAF partners.” 
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Another important initiative has been to establish multinational so-called Intelligence Fusion 
Centres at the regional commands. In RC (N) this element was separated from the traditional J2 
(intelligence) structure, and will according to Capt. Evans conduct deeper cross-functional 
studies and projects including network analysis bringing together all relevant actors including 
Afghan ministries that contribute to the COIN strategy. This will leave the somewhat 
undermanned J2 structure (in Capt. Evans words) to work more conventional opposing forces 
tasks; putting together intelligence reports, conduct briefings and bring intelligence expertise to 
planning situations. He suggests that this centre, shielded from the daily trivialities, will “talk to 
the folks that have real equities and interests in describing certain functional areas of RC North’s 
battle space.” The mindset of the Intelligence Fusion Centre is to “make every effort to form a 
network to attack the network […]. We are reaching out across the battle-space to network with 
organizations that talk to us.” This rather expansive objective implies intelligence sharing to be a 
major ingredient of the centre’s work practices. Maybe this is why Capt. Anderson suggests: 
“Now that every RC has a fusion centre it will be even that much easier to get information 
shared, ‘cause I just go to the fusion centre prior to going to the individual country in charge.” 
 
4.7 Intelligence ethics and moral dilemmas 
Intelligence ethics are not codified by ISAF and ethical questions related to intelligence sharing 
do not figure prominently among analysts’ expressed concerns. As one survey comment puts it: 
“Ethical questions should not play into the equation if clear guidance is/was provided to all 
incoming analysts.” This comment may point towards the invaluable military ethos of readiness 
to serve and to comply with orders, but as with many other oversimplified generic statements 
also this one hides a wealth of shades and details. Many ethical questions are for instance 
moulded into the concept of secrecy which demands operators to protect intelligence capacity 
and methods as well as their sources. Capt. Brown states “that there is a very strong feeling by 
people to make sure that they are not compromising [the well-being and safety of their sources]”.  
 
The moral dilemmas faced on a daily basis by analysts may best be explained by the following 
survey comment: 
 
We are often told stories about how senior officers and combat commanders share information 
without going through proper clearing procedures. If analysts were to do the same they would be 
fired. Most of this is likely rumours [sic] but it does present ethical dilemmas. 
           
 53 
 
 
            
          
 
 
 
Capt. Anderson addresses the same dilemma when he acknowledge that some of his counterparts 
may not have been properly vetted and authorized, but still finds it “a judgement call what you 
are going to give them, because you know that it will take a year or more to get that Afghan 
officer vetted […].”Angela Gendron’s statement cited in paragraph 3.4 above that “sharing often 
takes place in spite of the rules rather than because of them” thus gets some support. Capt Clark 
for instance finds that “in many instances you have people who are executing from the spirit of 
the law but maybe not to the exact letter of the law – to avoid that bottleneck or that process”.  
 
Capt. Evans promptly acknowledges the explicit security dilemmas associated with risktaking, or 
“the ethics of assuming the risk with our countrymen’s security […]”, as well as with “the 
information we don’t share”. He continues: “Sharing would certainly come with a certain cost – 
and there are tradeoffs on this – on the information sharing we conduct – there are tradeoffs 
involved in the information sharing that we don’t conduct.” The optimal balance between 
sharing and security may never be found, and it may be that to get more security and force 
protection in the future one needs to accept more risk in the present. The problem is that the 
opposite could also be true. Analysts with their legal responsibilities therefore expect a clearly 
articulated policy framework with associated procedures and education for sharing. Capt. 
Anderson with his experience and long exposure to sharing dilemmas has found a way or method 
for how to rationalize this that represents a somewhat curtailed version of the prevailing “share 
till it hurts”16 mantra: 
 
You need to ask yourself: […] what is [the] operational requirement – so what do the Afghans 
absolutely have to know in order to make partnered operations function, and what am I possibly 
compromising if I share that information. 
 
When asked about their thoughts on how ISAF provided intelligence could be misused to 
support random factions in internal Afghan power struggles (e.g. conflicts between local and 
regional power brokers and former warlords), or to tip of corrupt officials or criminal networks 
like the narcotics industry, Capt. Clark’s responses may be representative. “No, I have not seen 
that first hand […]” and “I haven’t linked the two of them.”  Seen in context with other 
statements such comments may reflect that the interviewed analysts do not handle cases or share 
                                                 
16
 ”Share till it hurts” is an expression that is attributed to the ISAF leadership and was much used in ISAF to 
explain the prevailing policy of intelligence partnering and sharing with the ANSF.  
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intelligence where these types of concerns would naturally surface. Only Capt. Anderson has 
thought about this and explains his way of reducing the possibility for misuse: “I share the 
intelligence across the board – that’s one of the mechanisms I have put in place. I have […] 
ANA, ANP [and] NDS in the same room”. He proposes that “you [have] got to ensure 
specifically that they all get the same information.” When elaborating he admits that some of the 
ways that the multinational forces organize and operate vis-à-vis the ANSF counteracts this 
requirement. But at least his section in IJC is aware and makes a point of inviting and 
encouraging all the three main Afghan security players to appear in partnered meetings. Such 
practices make it harder for any one of them to stovepipe and misuse intelligence. 
 
4.8 Other hurdles for intelligence sharing 
Some of the issues that were brought forward during interviews and observed or discussed in the 
margins cannot be grouped under any one of the above headings, or their subtle nature demands 
them to be commented upon separately. These are: (1) a lack of education and training 
opportunities for ISAF personnel; (2) the level of trust and confidence between ISAF and ANSF 
partners; and (3) internal Afghan cooperation and integration. 
 
4.8.1 A lack of education and training opportunities for ISAF personnel 
Some of the security concerns discussed in paragraph 4.5, like the vetting status of ANSF 
personnel, the use and understanding of different security markings and caveats, guidelines for 
what information should and should not be released and also best practices for making releasable 
products are typically alleviated through education and training. As discussed this is true also for 
the use of interpreters and for ethical issues. Capt. Anderson is very particular when he describes 
the needs: 
 
There ought to be a class that is vetted and proved by ISAF as to the best practices to share 
intelligence with ANSF. And if that programme of instruction along with appropriate and 
pertinent SOPs and directives from ISAF were made available to the individual analyst, they 
might feel a little more comfortable in sharing more intelligence. 
 
This is supported by a survey comment where an analyst complains about the lack of training on 
intelligence sharing before deploying to ISAF. Another officer mentioned a course he had 
attended teaching how to disclose intelligence to allied nations and ISAF, but that was more 
from a national policy viewpoint than supporting ISAF practices. The intelligence leadership in 
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IJC however expects that such issues will soon find their way into the existing pre-deployment 
staff training. There was, however, no mentioning of any in-theatre training opportunities. 
 
4.8.2 Trust and confidence between the partners 
Partnering in general and intelligence sharing in particular are dependent on a certain level of 
trust between those involved, something that will be examined further in chapter 5. Capt. Clark 
however hints to this when he mentions that ISAF’s intention is to “partner with them, live with 
them, work with them – over their shoulder.” He continues: “I think there is an element of trust 
that we must demonstrate to achieve success. So until we show that trust our relationship cannot 
work.”  Capt. Anderson picks up on this when he claims that during his long but intermittent stay 
with ISAF, he has never seen the command as engaged in partnering one on one as right now, 
and especially the senior leadership: “There is a good level of shared confidence”. Even among 
newly arrived staff members he finds a high level of confidence in their Afghan counterparts. 
Capt. Davies from RC (N) is a bit more reserved. He agrees that a certain level of trust has been 
established between a limited numbers of officers with a long term relationship, but he also 
reflects on examples of the opposite were their counterparts have proven less trustworthy. 
 
Herman’s citation above that every new foreign exchange represents a new risk is mostly about 
trust or the lack thereof. Capt. Clark compares the risks of sharing with that of giving a gift:  
 
You don’t know what the recipient is going to do with that [gift] in the end. So you give it with 
one thing in mind, and the biggest risk would be that they do not use it for the intended purpose. 
Because knowledge is power, if you, if we would share something and the recipient just holds on 
to it in order to further his own agenda, I think that is the biggest tactical risk of sharing – of 
information sharing. […] but if you don’t take that risk, you may not have a chance of success. 
 
Capt Evans discusses another aspect of trust. He mentions the impression that some nations are 
willing to share only to the extent that it is consistent with the reasons for their ISAF 
participation and that the Afghans are willing to share only if they see an immediate benefit to 
themselves or their organization. As long as this impression remains he fears that “there will 
continue to be severe lack of trust […]”, something he believes will put the COMISAF mandated 
sharing relationship at a disadvantage. 
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4.8.3 Internal Afghan cooperation and integration 
IJC staff officers often hinted that cooperation amongst the three main Afghan intelligence 
agencies (NDS, ANA through the Ministry of Defence and ANP through the Ministry of 
Interior) could improve, a view that is supported by earlier findings (U.S. SECDEF, 2008, p. 14): 
 
Historically, information has rarely been shared; collaborative analysis and coordinated collection 
have been the exception rather than the norm. [….] much work remains to build national 
intelligence structures that encourage intelligence sharing […].  
 
To overcome such obstacles, the international community and their Afghan partners have 
recently established mechanisms like Regional and Provincial Operational Coordination Centres 
(OCC-R / P).17 These facilities act as permanent meeting venues for the promotion of internal 
cooperation and integration within ANSF and between ANSF and ISAF (Dillard, 2009).  
 
To streamline inter-agency collaboration has however proved to be a difficult proposition even 
during the most benign of circumstances. The importance for ISAF comes from the fact that 
improved ANSF cooperation simplifies sharing and reduces the dangers of circular reporting. 
One way to pursue this is precisely through increased partnering and sharing efforts. Capt. 
Anderson alludes to this when he points out that:  “through pressure from us, […] we have 
brought in those who are willing to cooperate amongst the various agencies”. In practical terms 
this means to get ANA, ANP and NDS together in the same room, motivate them to share 
intelligence and also have them engaged in collaborative planning efforts. 
 
In such a setting ISAF analysts often find themselves in a role as facilitators, collecting and 
collating Afghan intelligence into a single coherent picture. They then compare this picture with 
ISAF’s own, and provide feedback to their Afghan counterparts suggesting where to focus 
further or have another look. This method facilitates the establishment of common situational 
awareness necessary for partnered planning and operations and it promotes development of the 
Afghan security sector. In addition to making Afghan agencies cooperate, it helps them to 
improve their entire intelligence chain from information requirements and capacity, via methods 
                                                 
17
 Funding for these centres are justified in the American defence budget for 2010: “[…] funding will augment 
operational coordination centers at the regional and joint provincial level to enable ANA, ANP, National Directorate 
of Security, and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operational coordination and intelligence sharing 
[my italics].” (U.S. SECDEF, 2009, p. 5) 
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and processes to products. The added bonus for ISAF is that it minimizes the needs for revealing 
sensitive information without necessarily compromising on efficiency or accuracy.  
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Frequency Percent
Less than two months 5 19
Less than six months 9 35
More than six months 9 35
More than a year 3 11
Sum 26 100
Experience
5 ISAF analysts knowledge and perceptions  
The purpose of this chapter is to expand on the qualitative research and to identify how analysts’ 
perceptions of the sharing environment influence ISAF’s ability for intelligence sharing with the 
ANSF. The chapter presents the results of the survey and discusses to what extent the findings 
support or contradict the findings in the previous chapter. The survey focus is on the secrecy, 
multinationality, and ethical factors that constitute the sharing environment in this study. As 
secrecy and the related security concerns were identified as the main challenge for sharing in 
both the analytical framework and qualitative interviews, these factors will be the main focus 
also in this chapter.  
 
The survey of all-source intelligence analysts resulted in 19 returns from the Information 
Dominance Centre of IJC and seven from the Joint Intelligence Centre of RC (N), representing 
the majority of such personnel in those organizations. Each of the 25 items on the self-
administered questionnaire presented five alternative answers on a Likert scale from “strongly 
agree” via “agree” and “uncertain” to “disagree” and “strongly disagree”. When commenting on 
the results, the two first and two last alternative answers are normally grouped. More resolution 
is, however, provided if significant or otherwise deemed necessary. 
 
Figure 5 presents the respondents’ accumulated employment time as intelligence analyst with 
ISAF. It shows that almost 50% of them have more than six months’ experience, something that 
for many nations represents more than one full deployment period or rotation. The level of 
experience is somewhat higher in Kabul 
than up north, with a mode between six 
months and a year in IJC versus 
between two and six months in RC (N). 
A main difference between the two 
commands, however, turns out to be 
their analysts’ experience from 
interaction with Afghan counterparts 
(figure 6). All RC (N) analysts 
responded that they personally seldom 
or never interact with Afghan counterparts, whereas 37% of the IJC analysts answered that they 
interact on a weekly basis or more. Only three of the 19 IJC analysts respond that they seldom or 
never interact. In the near future it is expected that this difference will level out, with the recently 
Figure 5: Experience as intelligence analysts with ISAF 
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established Intelligence Fusion Centre at RC (N) handling most of the regular host nation 
contacts. Finally, it turned out that all except one of the responding analysts were military, 
precluding this variable from further analysis.  
 
Frequency Percent
Seldom / never 10 39
Once a month 5 19
More than once a month 4 15
Once a week 2 8
More than once a week 5 19
Sum 26 100
Interaction
 
 
 
The importance of each analyst’s judgements with regards to intelligence sharing was discussed 
in chapter 3. Consequently, how they personally execute ISAF’s policy to a large extent 
determines ISAF’s overall ability for such sharing. In chapter 4 it was established that ISAF HQ 
has produced extensive policy documentation and procedures for sharing. When respondents are 
confronted with the statement “I believe ISAF’s partnership with the ANSF requires intelligence 
sharing”, 96% of them agree and 62% even strongly agree, suggesting an impressive level of 
support for a proactive sharing policy. It further turns out that 85% of the analysts are not afraid 
of making wrong judgements regarding such sharing, indicating confidence in their own skills. 
However, when challenged with the following statement “ISAF has provided me with clear 
policies for intelligence sharing with the ANSF”, six out of seven analysts in RC (N) disagree. 
Also in IJC the opinions are split. Less than half of the analysts agree, 21% disagree and the rest 
are uncertain. On the more specific statement “ISAF has established clear procedures and 
processes for disseminating intelligence to the ANSF”, the responses are evenly distributed with 
44% agreeing, 16% uncertain and 40% disagreeing. These results support the findings from the 
interviews in which the analysts’ depth of policy knowledge proved superficial, and it highlights 
a lack of education and training opportunities.  
 
Figure 6: Analysts' interaction with ANSF counterparts 
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When comparing the experience and interaction variables with how analysts respond to the 
statement “I know my ANSF counterparts well enough to assess their integrity and honesty”, 
there are also big variations. Only two out of five analysts who combine more than six months 
experience with weekly or more interaction find that they can agree with this statement, and the 
others are uncertain. Those with the shortest employment time and most infrequent interaction 
are typically the ones who are most doubtful. Of the approximately 40% that strongly disagree, 
90% have less than six months’ experience and 70% interact with Afghans on a monthly basis or 
less. In conclusion, it takes time to build personal relations, and even more so in a multicultural 
setting framed by secrecy and suspicion. As an anecdotal afterthought it is worth mentioning that 
while ISAF analysts come and go, Afghan officials remain in position longer and have to go 
through this process over and over again. The fact that only 11% of the responding analysts have 
accumulated more than a year of in-theatre intelligence experience indicates that ISAF’s ability 
for partnering and sharing is influenced negatively by its relatively inexperienced staffs. 
 
5.1 How to produce intelligence for sharing, and are shared secrets still secrets? 
Secrecy is a diverse concept, and the related security provisions are quite demanding even for 
experienced operators. This makes collaboration between even long-time trusted partners 
difficult. Security sensitivities are therefore the main reason why multilateral intelligence 
sharing, and especially with strange host nations, becomes the extreme sport of international 
relations. Maybe the most important player in this perilous ISAF “sporting event” is the lonely 
analyst who produces shareable intelligence and in some way, shape or form also perform the 
actual dissemination of it, either by hand or through vocal and/or visual sharing. The analyst’s 
knowledge of ISAF’s procedures and processes for intelligence sharing as well as perceptions of 
the security environment to a large extent determine ISAF’s ability to share intelligence with its 
Afghan partners. As military personnel they are expected to follow orders and carry out assigned 
tasks as best they can within the limitations they are given, but as already established; the 
personal responsibilities for protection of secrets are explicit and even covered by law in many 
countries.  
 
When analysts are confronted with the statement “I’m confident how to produce intelligence 
products releasable to the ANSF” more than 60% agree, and some even strongly. However, 
approximately 20% disagree and 20 % are uncertain. This picture does not change much when 
asked if they are confident how to mark intelligence products. The overall confidence in their 
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own skills seems to be somewhat higher among those who also find that ISAF has provided them 
with clear policies and established clear procedures and processes for sharing. It is on the other 
hand interesting that 30% of those responding that they are uncertain or disagree with the claim 
that ISAF has provided them with clear policies and established clear procedures and processes 
for sharing, are still quite positive when assessing their own skills. Some of this inconsistency 
could hypothetically be explained with former experience from multilateral intelligence sharing 
and disclosure processes, and partly by analysts simply following established work habits and 
routines. There seems to be even less correlation between how analysts perceive their own skills 
and their actual in-theatre experience, or even by how often they interact with Afghans. IJC 
analysts, however, appear to be more confident than their RC (N) colleagues. These findings 
suggest that analysts arrive in theatre with a reasonably sound general understanding and know-
how on how to produce and label intelligence products for sharing, but that they lack mission 
specific introductions. It could also point to an unhealthy tendency of taking on established work 
habits without necessary consideration. 
 
The next logical step is to ask if the analysts trust that ISAF procedures and processes facilitate 
secure sharing with the ANSF. Almost 60% of the IJC analysts believe so, compared to none of 
those from RC (N). Most of the remaining IJC analysts respond that they are uncertain, with only 
10% of the total sample disagreeing. 
However, when asked to consider the 
statement “I believe the intelligence 
we share with the ANSF is not 
compromised”, only 20% agree, while 
almost 60% disagree (figure 7). Those 
who agree with the statement are 
among those who also believe that 
ISAF’s procedures and processes 
facilitate secure sharing. All this could 
indicate that whatever procedures and 
processes ISAF establishes, most analysts still perceive that secrets will be compromised. A 
notable minority on the other hand believes that such procedures will actually succeed in 
protecting secrets. The differences between IJC and RC (N) may also indicate that increased 
interaction and collaboration could increase analysts’ belief in the utility of procedures and 
processes.  
Figure 7: Analysts’ security perceptions 
Frequency Percent
Strongly agree 2 8
Agree 3 12
Uncertain 6 23
Disagree 10 38
Strongly disagree 5 19
Sum 26 100
I believe the intelligence we share with the ANSF 
is not compromised
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As discussed briefly in chapter 4, there are many reasons why secrets are compromised, all the 
way from a lack of basic security routines via corruption to regular espionage staged by foreign 
intelligence services. Figure 8 present how ISAF analysts respond to statements that discuss 
serious security risks which potentially could threaten their Afghan counterparts. In turn, this 
indicates how well analysts believe the ANSF are able to protect classified material. Only a 
small minority believe their counterparts to be relatively free from corruption and safe from 
extortion and infiltration. A solid majority does not agree, indicating that they rather believe the 
opposite to be the case. There is no evident correlation between these findings and the analysts’ 
in-theatre experience or frequency of interaction with their partners. In summary, ISAF analysts 
believe that their Afghan counterparts are subject to substantial security threats.  
 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Strongly agree 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agree 2 8 4 15 3 12
Uncertain 8 31 8 31 5 19
Disagree 9 34 11 42 11 42
Strongly disagree 7 27 3 12 7 27
Sum 26 100 26 100 26 100
I don't believe our ANSF 
counterparts are infiltrated
I don't believe corruption is a 
problem among our specific 
ANSF counterparts
I believe our ANSF 
counterparts are relatively 
safe from extortion
 
 
 
When asked to consider the statement “I sometimes feel pressured to share intelligence that I 
believe should be withheld on security reasons”, 62% of the respondents disagree and of those 
23% even strongly. However, a substantial minority of 23% agrees and 15% are uncertain. The 
survey does not reveal common characteristics between these analysts, but it is noteworthy that 
so many of them strongly disagree and seemingly never feel pressured to forsake security. 
However, most of these respondents have less than two months of in-theatre experience. The 
responses on the next statement: “I believe security concerns always trump the need for sharing” 
is perhaps more surprising with 34% agreeing and as many as 38% disagreeing. Even if it is not 
possible to draw firm conclusions from these responses, pressure to share intelligence does not 
appear to figure prominently among most analysts’ worries. Many on the other hand seem to 
have an almost stoic “matter of fact” attitude towards manifest security risks, and appear not to 
be such deep-rooted security absolutists that some may expect.   
Figure 8: Analysts’ security perceptions in more detail 
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Evidently, quite a few analysts can imagine instances were security should yield for some higher 
purpose. This is reinforced by their responses to the next two statements. 27% agree that when in 
doubt they “tend to lean towards sharing and accept some security risks” while 15% are 
uncertain, and the rest disagree. In fact, almost all those IJC analysts that tend to lean towards 
sharing or respond that they are uncertain, at the same time trust ISAF procedures and processes 
to facilitate secure sharing. They also tend to agree with the following statement: “I principally 
trust and follow my own judgement on what to share and what not to share”. It turns out that 
77% of all respondents agree to this and 19% even strongly agree. This is one of just two items 
were no analysts respond that they are uncertain, and the remaining 23% are evenly split 
between disagreeing and strongly disagreeing. Of those 23%, two thirds seldom or never interact 
with their ANSF counterparts. Drawn together this indicates that most analysts trust their own 
judgement when it comes to sharing and that quite a few of them, at least occasionally, tend to 
favour sharing over security. 
 
These rather wide ranging findings support what was exposed in chapter 4: that analysts lack 
detailed knowledge about ISAF policies, procedures and processes for intelligence sharing with 
the ANSF. While they seem to be enthusiastic about such sharing and to a certain extent also 
positive with reference to their own skills and the usefulness of ISAF procedures and processes, 
they at the same time seem to be quite realistic about the security risks involved. In other words 
most analysts: (1) feel that they know what is expected of them; (2) to a certain extent believe 
they know how to do it; and (3) have a sobering appreciation of the risks involved. The 
responses also support earlier findings which indicate that quite a few analysts are pragmatic 
when it comes to security, and that they seek to find workable solutions for sharing where 
possible. The question is whether their perceptions of the security environment limit ISAF’s 
overall ability for intelligence sharing. Given each analyst’s (legal) obligations for the protection 
of secrets, the answer is self-evident. There is also a limit to how much risk individuals are 
willing to take. When reviewing how they expressed themselves during interviews and 
comparing that with how they responded on the survey, there is little to indicate that analysts are 
negligent or careless when it comes to security. Some private initiatives to overcome the security 
challenges and dilemmas were discussed in chapter 4, but they are both isolated and resource 
intensive. There is little to suggest that “best practices” on sharing is widely debated. 
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5.2 Multinationality – adding another layer to the complexity 
Findings in chapter 4 indicate that there are substantial differences between ISAF’s troop-
contributing nations in how they look upon and practice (local) intelligence sharing with the 
ANSF. Even if analysts recognize that ISAF is moving towards a more hospitable and inclusive 
environment for information sharing, they find that national caveats and differences still cause 
friction and prevent a uniform ISAF-wide sharing regime. Some use the term “stovepipes” when 
discussing national and agencies sharing practices. It was further identified that differences in 
national processes and procedures as well as a multitude of information systems cause problems 
for sharing. In an open study many such aspects can only be superficially examined and nation-
specific variables must in general be left out. Analysts’ ability for producing and disseminating 
shareable intelligence will, however, be influenced by the support given from ISAF’s organic 
intelligence collectors and national agencies alike, and also by how well the analyst knows the 
practices and routines of subordinate headquarters. The last aspect is important for him for 
different reasons, among them to preclude or at least estimate the dangers of circular reporting. 
 
The responses on the statement “In general I’m aware of what our subordinate headquarters 
share with the ANSF (within my functional or geographical area of responsibility)” are varied 
with 42% agreeing, the same number disagreeing and the rest being uncertain. Also those that 
agree or disagree strongly are equally split with 8% on each. In RC (N) most analysts disagree, 
but with the small sample size this is not indicative of a major difference between the two 
headquarters. However, that so many analysts from a regional command disagree coincides with 
the proposition that local intelligence relations between homogenous national forces and local 
host nation are more bilaterally oriented (and thus more isolated from multinational reach or 
review). 
 
To produce shareable multinational intelligence the analysts depend on collectors and nations to 
supply them with information and intelligence that can be released further and that are marked 
accordingly. It turns out that 50% of the analysts agree that “intelligence collectors usually mark 
their information if further dissemination to the ANSF is permissible.” 31% disagree, and the 
rest are uncertain. It is important to establish that agreement to this statement does not indicate if 
analysts are content with the volume of releasable products, only that they are not kept in 
ignorance. One collector agency could for instance mark all their products “not for further 
release” and still fall within the statement. As was mentioned in chapter 4, one nation asserted 
that they would not share anything. When asked to comment on the same statement substituting 
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“intelligence collectors” with “nations”, 62% agree and 31% disagree that nations usually mark 
their information if further dissemination to the ANSF is permissible. Notably 23% changed 
their response from agreeing or disagreeing to the opposite. If nothing else, this supports the 
findings that analysts have mixed experience with how nations and collector agencies practice 
sharing and also how they support ISAF’s sharing initiatives.  
 
5.3 Ethics – the absent debate 
The last factor to be examined is how analysts’ knowledge and perceptions related to intelligence 
ethics and local moral dilemmas may limit ISAF’s ability for intelligence sharing. As established 
in chapter 4, ISAF has not codified ethics for intelligence sharing as part of their documentation 
and ethical questions related to sharing does not appear to figure prominently among analysts’ 
expressed concerns. Even so, 38% of them agree to a statement proclaiming that “ISAF has clear 
ethical standards for intelligence sharing with the ANSF” while the same number is uncertain 
and 24% disagree. There are few noticeable differences between how analysts from the two 
commands respond to this and subsequent ethical statements, and also little correlation with what 
they have answered on other statements. In fact, 35% of them see few ethical problems with 
disseminating intelligence to the ANSF, while 46% disagree and 11% even strongly disagree. 
This indicates that some analysts believe they are following expressed ISAF standards and 
guidelines, but also that many are concerned about underlying ethical challenges related to 
sharing. One dilemma that most of them have to relate to is the ever present conflict between 
obeying security demands and fulfilling sharing needs. This combined security and ethical 
dilemma is hypothetically what drives analysts’ responses. As alluded to in the interviews, some 
may be of the opinion that ISAF’s policy for intelligence sharing renders separate ethical 
guidelines redundant. 
 
The statement “I don’t believe ISAF provided intelligence fuel Afghan power struggles or 
otherwise cause civilian suffering” is designed to force analysts to consider specific ethical 
issues that relate to Afghanistan’s recent history where warlords, strongmen and powerbrokers 
have ruled the hinterlands and been in control of much of the local politics. 38% agree with the 
statement, and 31% disagree. The percentages which strongly agreed or strongly disagreed were 
also of equal size. These rather inconsistent answers could indicate that analysts disagree 
between themselves if shared intelligence is misused in this specific way, or simply that the 
statement opens for different interpretation. Seen in context with the interviews and also with the 
general field observations and conversations in theatre, the mixed responses could however also 
            
66  
 
 
           
           
 
 
indicate that many analysts do not work on issues or share intelligence where these types of 
concerns would naturally surface. However, the mixed responses suggest that many analysts are 
concerned about the cascading effects of ISAF’s intelligence sharing.   
 
When confronted with the statement “I see few dilemmas between my professional ethics and 
ISAF’s policy for intelligence sharing with the ANSF”, 54% respond that they agree. There is, 
however, a substantial minority of 23% that disagree and also a relatively big share responding 
that they are uncertain. This suggests that many analysts are content, but it also highlights that 
quite a few recognize dilemmas and could be anxious about the results. On the next statement; “I 
sometimes feel pressured to share intelligence that I believe should be withheld on ethical 
reasons”, only 8% agree. 38% disagree and another 27% strongly disagree. There are some 
interesting similarities between how analysts respond on this statement and on a similar 
statement above were “ethical reasons” was substituted with “security reasons”. Of those 
analysts who strongly disagree that they feel pressured to share intelligence, all but one 
responded the same way for security reasons. Also, just one analyst has opposite responses on 
these two statements. This may indicate that analysts are not typically put under pressure to share 
specific intelligence products, but rather given latitude to perform partnering and sharing in a 
way that does not compromise their professional ethics or security concerns. The relatively wide 
and incoherent distribution of responses on ethical statements may, however, indicate a lack of 
dialogue and attention to such challenges and moral dilemmas involved in intelligence sharing. 
This could be accentuated by a lack of codification and of missing education and training 
opportunities. To leave ethical considerations solely to the individual analyst could reduce both 
the coherence and efficiency of ISAF’s intelligence sharing. 
 
           
 67 
 
 
            
          
 
 
6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the most important findings from the research and draw 
conclusions on issues that limit ISAF’s ability for sharing intelligence with the Afghan National 
Security Forces. Except for the first point below, which arguably is the most important hurdle 
against sharing, the findings are presented in order of their appearance throughout the study. An 
overall conclusion is that ISAF share less intelligence with the ANSF than what is stipulated by 
ISAF policy. At the same time, the sharing that do take place seems to have a higher security 
cost than intended by the same policy. A main reason behind this is that intelligence analysts 
have to rely on their own subjective judgement when practicing intelligence sharing in overly 
complex working conditions. Some of the hurdles and challenges identified in this study are 
within ISAF’s mandate to mend, while others depend on international cooperation and goodwill. 
 
• Lack of education and training on intelligence sharing. Analysts are very specific 
about the lack of more formal education and training opportunities on ISAF’s policies, 
procedures and processes for intelligence sharing. Documentation for such sharing exists 
in the form of written communication and Standard Operating Procedures, but the 
analysts’ knowledge about the contents proved superficial. The effect is insecurity and 
restraints among intelligence professionals as well as force-wide differences in sharing 
practices and performance. Security concerns like the vetting status of ANSF personnel; 
the use and understanding of different security markings and caveats; guidelines for what 
information should and should not be released and also best practices for making 
releasable products are among those issues that could be eased through education and 
training. Education and training could also teach intelligence professionals to make better 
use of interpreters, and it could be used as a venue for discussing ethics and moral 
dilemmas related to sharing. The rapid turnover caused by short rotation periods for 
military personnel just underscores the importance of a more formal system for the 
transfer of experience and maintenance of corporate memory. 
 
• Missing quality control with translations and poor utilization of interpreters. 
Through their work analysts sometimes experience that translated information simply 
does not make sense, or that mistakes have humiliating or even serious operational 
effects. They are however not aware of any ISAF specific mechanisms for quality control 
with the work of interpreters, and some even feel that this is one of the major weaknesses 
with ISAF’s partnering efforts. Furthermore, the use of interpreters during partner 
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meetings has not been properly rehearsed, either by Afghans or ISAF analysts. Sentences 
and statements tend to become too long and complicated and cover too many topics for 
interpreters to keep up. The result may be poor translations that fail to convey facts and 
messages from intelligence products and conversations. 
 
• Lack of mechanisms for preventing circular reporting. Even though circular reporting 
is a widely recognized problem amongst intelligence professionals, the research does not 
identify it as being much debated or emphasized within ISAF. Some analysts and leaders 
acknowledge certain problems with circular reporting related to sharing, but individuals 
that work to preclude it from being accidentally or intentionally introduced into the 
intelligence cycle are seemingly left to find and implement their own countermeasures. 
Such sporadic and isolated efforts influence ISAF’s coherence and effectiveness, and 
therefore also to some extent its ability for intelligence sharing. Rather surprisingly, the 
research did not identify the fear of circular reporting as a main obstacle for sharing. 
 
• Inconsistent security marking of intelligence products. None of the analysts, either 
interviewed or asked in the margins, was able to explain precisely which security 
markings to use on which system for intelligence sharing with the ANSF. Without global 
standards, troop-contributing nations follow their own regulations or NATO standards, or 
even a mix thereof, when labelling secret products. The resulting variations and 
differences add to analysts’ insecurity and restraint. Even though the situation is 
improving, many nations and agencies still do not specify if their intelligence can be 
shared with Afghans or not. Those who do, often mark the whole document rather than 
each individual paragraph as is intended with security markings. The result is that 
analysts often must confer with sources on every tiny bit of information they want to 
include in their releasable products, something that takes time, if at all feasible. 
 
• Too many information systems and access levels. Some ISAF analysts use three 
different classified information systems in their daily work; a “mission secret” system; a 
“NATO secret” system; and finally, a national system like the American “SIPRNET”. To 
work several systems with limited interconnectivity is always demanding, but it becomes 
even more confusing when each system brings separate standards for security markings 
and access rules. This diversity of information systems highlights another source of 
irritation, especially amongst intelligence professionals from non-NATO countries. Not 
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only are they denied access to certain information and intelligence, but most of them even 
have restricted access to work-spaces where “NATO secret” systems are present. This 
class-system with its concentric circles of trust creates internal differences, leaving some 
coalition members less informed and involved in intelligence matters than others. To 
operate more than one mission wide information system is thus an obstacle for all types 
of intelligence sharing. 
 
• Underdeveloped Afghan security standards. ISAF’s ability for legitimate disclosure 
and dissemination of intelligence depends on their Afghan partner’s ability to protect 
secrets. Generally, ISAF analysts highlight dismal Afghan security standards as the major 
security concern and bottlenecks for sharing. What causes most concern is obviously a 
lack of “NATO-compatible” Afghan traditions and culture for handling sensitive 
information as much as deliberate leaks. This points to a moral dilemma that is troubling 
many analysts; the dilemma between security and sharing. To share what should have 
been withheld could in a worst case situation have fatal consequences, but so could the 
opposite. Intelligence sharing is, however, so important for the counterinsurgency 
strategy that the ISAF leadership is willing to accept much risk. Even so, this does not 
release intelligence professionals from their individual (legal) responsibilities for the 
protection of secrets, and especially secrets that are provided by a third party. To carry 
out sharing in a high risk environment requires a high degree of trust, something that is 
not always present. 
 
• Different national policies, procedures and caveats. ISAF has limited integral capacity 
for intelligence collection and depends on support from the troop-contributing nations to 
accomplish their mission. However, each nation comes with its own set of policies for 
intelligence sharing and they enforce their own caveats. Intelligence professionals 
experience big differences, and some nations and agencies are very restrictive. These 
differences lead to geographical variations that accumulate from the local tactical level 
all the way up to the force headquarters, with some units and headquarters being more 
forthcoming at sharing than others. In addition, some nations employ complex and time-
consuming procedures for intelligence disclosure and dissemination, leading to a loss of 
both timeliness and relevance especially when dealing with Afghan partners. 
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• Lack of debate on intelligence ethics and moral dilemmas. Intelligence ethics are not 
codified by ISAF and ethical questions related to intelligence sharing does not appear to 
be at the forefront of the analysts’ concerns. Even so, most analysts are aware that ethics 
influence their sharing efforts. In fact, moral dilemmas are manifest in much of their 
daily work where the main struggle seems to be between security demands and the 
operational necessity of sharing intelligence with a challenging partner. This plight of 
being “damned if you do and damned if you don’t” seems to worry individuals more than 
ISAF as an organization. Some analysts seem to put security first, while others seem to 
prioritize sharing. The lack of a “Unit Disclosure Officer” in Regional Command North 
just accentuates the point that this is mostly left as an individual dilemma. The cost for 
ISAF is a loss of influence on important security questions and sharing priorities as well 
as less uniformity of its sharing efforts.  
 
This study’s analytical framework presented some basic assumptions of factors that potentially 
could limit intelligence sharing from a multinational force to the host nation in contexts such as 
Afghanistan. A modified model of the intelligence cycle highlighted communication and circular 
reporting as two such factors. Communication was found to be important while circular 
reporting appeared to be of less significance in this case. The reason for this is uncertain, but the 
lack of attention to circular reporting could indicate a weakness with ISAF’s intelligence 
production and sharing efforts. The model suggests that the possibility of shared intelligence 
being channelled back into the intelligence cycle as new information should have constituted a 
bigger concern within ISAF, and that more staff resources should have been allocated to prevent 
such results from intelligence sharing. The analytical framework then introduced the “sharing 
environment” consisting of the three factors secrecy, multinationality and ethics. All of these 
proved to influence and limit ISAF’s ability for intelligence sharing. However, the ethical factor 
proved a little less salient and it was less explicitly discussed and recognized among intelligence 
analysts.  
 
In conclusion, a similar framework with the five listed factors could be used for studying 
intelligence sharing in contexts where a multinational force supports a host nation government 
fighting insurgencies. The modified model of the intelligence cycle is even less specific, and 
could have wider application for intelligence theory. Another important discussion presented in 
the analytical framework was whether shifting from a “need to know” to a “need to share” 
approach to intelligence sharing would increase collaboration between agencies and international 
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partners. It was suggested that it would be better to identify more exactly what friends and 
partners need to know rather than to advocate a new culture. The wide range of responses from 
ISAF analysts when asked to consider statements which prioritize between sharing and security, 
accentuated the restraint and uncertainty that was expressed during the interviews. In practical 
terms, the all-source community appears slightly divided and even confused in their response 
when sharing is stated more as a separate objective than as a means. A forced mental process of 
identifying who actually need to know certain information, also among host nation agencies, 
could help to realign the community. Over time, active identification of all those who “need to 
know” could increase the amount of intelligence sharing without unnecessary compromising on 
security. 
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Annex A: Glossary 
 
 
Part 1 - Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
ANA Afghan National Army 
ANP Afghan National Police 
ANSF  Afghan national security forces 
COIN Counterinsurgency 
GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
HN host nation 
HUMINT human intelligence 
IDC Information Dominance Centre 
IFC Intelligence Fusion Centre 
IFOR Implementation Force 
IJC ISAF Joint Command 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
JIC Joint Intelligence Centre 
JPOC Joint Planning Operation Centre 
KFOR Kosovo Force 
NDS National Directorate of Security 
NIC National Intelligence Cell 
NMCC National Military Coordination Centre 
OCC R / P Operational Coordination Centre Regional / Provincial  
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
RC (N) Regional Command North 
SFOR Stabilization Force 
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SOP Standard Operating Procedures 
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Part 2 – Terms and definitions 
 
The terms and definitions used in this paper are in priority order drawn from one of the cited 
official references; (1) NATO standards in accordance with AAP-6; (2) U.S. standards in 
accordance with Joint Publications 2-0, 2.01 and 3-24; (3) U.N. standards in accordance with the 
“Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public administration” by the 
committee of Experts on Public Administration (UN, 2006); or (4) they are amalgamated or 
revised from corresponding definitions in those references and made specific for this study. 
 
Accessing and Collection – Used here to describe the process of accessing any secret, open or 
data protected sources of information, acquisition of the relevant pieces of that information and 
converting it into forms suitable for analysis and assessment. This process is performed by 
collection agencies. 
 
Agency – Used here for any organization or individual engaged in the processes of accessing, 
collecting and/or analysing and assessing information.  
 
All-source intelligence - Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that 
incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including human resources intelligence, 
imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-
source data in the production of finished intelligence. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 
 
Analysis and assessment – Used here to describe the process of conversing information into 
finished intelligence through the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of all source 
data, with assessments being those products with a forward-looking perspective. This process is 
performed by all-source agencies. 
 
Circular reporting – Used here for describing a situation where shared intelligence information 
is channelled back into the intelligence cycle as new information (duplication), sometimes also 
being distorted or interpreted differently on the way deceiving analysts to believe that they have 
got corroboration on earlier reports. 
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Collation - (1) The grouping together of related items to provide a record of events and facilitate 
further processing; and (2) To compare critically two or more items or documents concerning the 
same general subject; normally accomplished in the processing and exploitation portion of the 
intelligence process. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 
 
Confirmation - An information item is said to be confirmed when it is reported for the second 
time, preferably by another independent source whose reliability is considered when confirming 
information. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 
 
Corruption – Influencing the decision-making process of a public officer or authority, or 
influence peddling; dishonesty or breach of trust by a public officer in the exercise of his duty; 
insider dealing/conflicts of interests; [and] influence peddling by the use of fraudulent means 
such as bribery, blackmail, which includes the use of election fraud. It is a form of behaviour that 
deviates from ethics, morality, tradition, law and civic virtue. (UN, 2006) 
 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) - Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an 
insurgency and to address any core grievances. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009) 
 
Disclosure – Used here to describe the process of clearing intelligence for release and its 
subsequent dissemination to authorized users outside the originating nation or organization. 
 
Dissemination - The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any 
suitable means, to those who need it. (NATO, 2009b) 
 
Ethics – Used here as the standards which guide the behaviour and actions of organizations and 
personnel involved in intelligence sharing and which may be referred to as moral laws or policy.  
 
Governance - The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behaviour 
by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, 
including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under 
inclusive, constitutional authority. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009) 
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Host Nation (HN) – Used here to describe a nation which voluntary receives the forces and/or 
supplies of a multinational peace support or intervention force to be located on, to operate in, or 
to transit through its territory.  
 
Intelligence - The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign 
nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential 
operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the 
organizations engaged in such activity. (NATO, 2009b) 
 
Information systems – Used here to cover all aspects of IT support to the multinational force 
and its national contributions but with a particular emphasis on those systems that intelligence 
analysts use for their normal work as well as those national systems they access and/or or get 
information from on a routinely basis.  
 
Insurgency - The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks 
to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group 
itself. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009) 
 
Intelligence Community – Used here to describe all departments or agencies of a government 
or multinational force that are concerned with intelligence activity, either in an oversight, 
managerial, support, or participatory role.  
 
Intelligence cycle - The sequence of activities whereby information is obtained, assembled, 
converted into intelligence and made available to users. (NATO, 2009b) 
 
Planning and direction - The determination of intelligence requirements, development of 
appropriate intelligence architecture, preparation of a collection plan, and issuance of orders and 
requests to information collection agencies. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007) 
 
Operational control - The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that 
the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, 
time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. 
It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units 
concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (NATO, 2009b) 
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Reach back - The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or 
equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2009) 
 
Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) - Worldwide SECRET level packet 
switch network that uses high-speed internet protocol routers and high-capacity Defence 
Information Systems Network circuitry. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004) 
 
Security - The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities 
and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as 
against loss or unauthorized disclosure. (NATO, 2009b) 
 
Security Classification - A category or grade assigned to defence information or material to 
indicate the degree of danger to NATO/national security that would result from its unauthorized 
disclosure and the standard of protection required to guard against unauthorized disclosure. 
(NATO, 2009b) 
 
Security Clearance - An administrative determination by competent national authority that an 
individual is eligible, from a security standpoint, for access to classified information. (NATO, 
2009b) 
 
Security Sector Reform (SSR) - The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a 
government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2009) 
 
Source - The means or system that can be used to observe and record information relating to the 
condition, situation, or activities of a targeted location, organization, or individual. An 
intelligence source can be people, documents, equipment, or technical sensors. (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2007) 
 
Threat Warning - The urgent communication and acknowledgement of time-critical 
information essential for the preservation of life and/or vital resources. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2004)
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Annex B: Interview guide 
 
 
Name………………………… 
Rank…………………………. 
Position……………….......... 
Time…………………………. 
 
 
My research objective is to reveal limitations on ISAFs ability to disseminate multinational 
intelligence to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The collection of empirical data 
consists of two parts; first a few semi-structured interviews with central intelligence officers like 
yourself to investigate ISAF procedures and routines as well as recognized problem areas, and 
then, adjusted as necessary for the findings during these interviews, a survey of intelligence 
analysts in ISAF HQ and RC North to reveal their knowledge and attitudes for producing and 
disseminating releasable intelligence. 
 
The interview will last approximately 1 hour, and it will cover the following areas: 
 
• General issues (ISAF policy and practice) 
• Security issues  
• Issues stemming from the multinational composition of ISAF 
• Ethical issues 
 
This research is conducted at the UNCLASSIFIED level and the interviews will be taped, 
transcribed and stored by the researcher. 
 
Your responses will be used for research purposes only. 
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ISAF Policy 
The first issue I would like to discuss is ISAF’s policy for dissemination of intelligence to the 
ANSF. Could I please ask you to elaborate a bit on this, and also how you view the performance 
of this headquarters? 
• Procedures and processes - responsibilities and roles  
• Major challenges and/or bottlenecks (weaknesses in the chain) 
• Education and training opportunities (for those producing intelligence for sharing)  
 
Security  
Proceeding from general policy matters, I would now like you to comment on security issues 
related to sharing. What do you see as the major challenges here? 
• NATO security regulations (strengths and weaknesses) 
• Vetting and authorization of Afghans (how many – what problems) 
• Procedures for the translation of written and oral products / quality control (literal accuracy and 
how the message is understood by Afghan audiences) 
• Level of trust between this headquarters and its ANSF counterparts. 
 
Multinationality 
Then, I would like to discuss how multinationality influence sharing. Could you please include 
some comments on coherence between the different headquarters and nations?   
• Influence of formalities such as document templates, security labels and dissemination keys 
(asset from know-how and uniformity or drawback from habitual behaviour - “copy last”) 
• Biggest risks. (Circular / contradictory reporting) 
• Common databases and analytical tools. 
 
Ethics 
My last theme is about ethics. Could I please ask you to elaborate on ethical challenges and 
possible consequences of sharing, including what ethical guidelines ISAF employ? 
• Showcasing of coalition differences (opening for manipulation) 
• Fuelling of internal Afghan power struggles (unintended ethnic favouritism) 
• Other misuse (organized and petty crime e.g.)  
• The divide between internal security and foreign intelligence (democratic challenges).  
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Annex C: Survey questionnaire 
 
1 Purpose of this questionnaire 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to investigate ISAF intelligence analyst’s knowledge and 
attitudes for producing and disseminating intelligence to the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF). 
 
By participating in this study you will get the opportunity to communicate your experiences and 
perceptions regarding important aspects of the multinational strategy for Afghanistan in general 
and for ISAF partnering with the ANSF in particular. 
 
2 Your rights as participant  
As participant in this study, you have the right to: 
 
1. Decline participation. 
 
2. Withdraw from the research at any time during your participation. 
 
There will be no consequences of declining or withdrawing from the study. 
 
If further information about the research or your rights as participant is needed, please contact 
Helge Arnli in person or at helge.arnli@gmail.com.  
 
3 Instructions 
Your responses to this questionnaire will be treated as anonymous and confidential and will 
only be used for research purposes. Please answer all questions. 
 
The questionnaire is expected to take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
1. Please indicate your response to each question by encircling one of the provided 
alternatives. If you want to correct, please make an X over the false option. 
 
2. Statistically respondents tend to lean towards a central tendency, i.e. the middle of the 
scale. Please keep this in mind and make, if possible, choices based on preferences. 
 
3. Please read the questionnaire carefully and reflect for a moment before answering. 
 
4. The questionnaire is individual and cooperation would ruin the research reliability. 
 
Thank you for your participation. Your contribution is highly appreciated! 
 
 
 
□ By checking this box I agree that I have been informed of my rights reference participating 
in this research and give my consent for the researchers to use my response for research 
purposes only. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC DETAILS 
 
Please mark the appropriate option. 
 
Employment type: 
Military   □1 
Civilian   □2 
 
 
Total accumulated employment time as intelligence analyst with ISAF: 
Less than two months  □1  
Less than six months  □2 
More than six months  □3 
More than a year  □4 
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Please indicate to what extent you agree with the statements below by encircling the 
corresponding number. 
 
Q Statement 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
 
ISAF has provided me with clear 
policies for intelligence sharing 
with the ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
 
ISAF has established clear 
procedures and processes for 
disseminating intelligence to the 
ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
 
I’m confident how to produce 
intelligence products releasable to 
the ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
 
I’m confident how to mark 
intelligence products releasable to 
the ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 
 
I believe ISAF’s partnership with 
the ANSF requires intelligence 
sharing.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
 
I trust that our procedures and 
processes facilitate secure sharing 
with the ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 
 
I believe the intelligence we share 
with the ANSF is not 
compromised. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 
 
I don’t believe corruption is a 
problem among our specific 
ANSF counterparts.    
 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
 
I believe our ANSF counterparts 
are relatively safe from extortion. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please indicate to what extent you agree with the statements below by encircling the 
corresponding number.  
 
Q Statement 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
10 
 
I don’t believe our ANSF 
counterparts are infiltrated. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 
 
I have ANSF counterparts that I 
meet on regular basis (please 
encircle how often). 
 
Seldom/n
ever 
Once a 
month 
More than 
once a 
month  
Once a 
week 
More 
than 
once a 
week 
12 
 
I know my ANSF counterparts 
well enough to assess their 
integrity and honesty.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 
 
I sometimes feel pressured to 
share intelligence that I believe 
should be withheld on security 
reasons. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 
 
I believe security concerns always 
trump the need for sharing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 
 
I principally trust and follow my 
own judgement on what to share 
and what not to share. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 
 
When in doubt I tend to lean 
towards sharing and accept some 
security risks.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 
17 
 
In general I’m aware of what our 
subordinate headquarters share 
with the ANSF (within my 
functional or geographical area of 
responsibility). 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Please indicate to what extent you agree with the statements below by encircling the 
corresponding number.  
 
Q Statement 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
18 
 
Intelligence collectors usually 
mark their information if further 
dissemination to the ANSF is 
permissible.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
19 
 
Nations usually mark their 
intelligence products if further 
dissemination to the ANSF is 
permissible. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
20 
 
ISAF has clear ethical standards 
for intelligence sharing with the 
ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
21 
 
I see few ethical problems with 
disseminating intelligence to the 
ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
22 
 
I don’t believe ISAF provided 
intelligence fuel Afghan power 
struggles or otherwise cause 
civilian suffering. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
23 
 
I see few dilemmas between my 
professional ethics and ISAF’s 
policy for intelligence sharing 
with the ANSF. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
24 
 
I sometimes feel pressured to 
share intelligence that I believe 
should be withheld on ethical 
reasons. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
25 
 
I’m afraid of making wrong 
judgements regarding intelligence 
sharing. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Q26: Please state any additional remarks or thoughts with reference to security aspects of disseminating 
intelligence to the ANSF (how, in your mind, security aspects influences or should influence ISAF’s 
intelligence sharing). 
. 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ 
Q27: Please state any additional remarks or thoughts with reference to multinational issues of 
disseminating intelligence to the ANSF (how, in your experience, multi-nationality influences ISAF’s 
ability for intelligence sharing). 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ 
Q28: Please state any additional remarks or thoughts with reference to ethical issues of disseminating 
intelligence to the ANSF (how you feel ethics influences or should influence ISAF intelligence sharing). 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________ 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire.  
 
 
